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In each country spectrum is scarce and expensive and as such it should treated carefully 
in terms of efficiency usage. The spectrum can be reallocated, reassigned and resold  through 
agreements between the participants. In some places, interference exists (internalas well as 
external, i.e., from bordering countries) resulting in inefficient usage of spectrum, not respecting 
the law of telecommunication, the poor communication, loss of revenue, damage to 
telecommunication equipment etc. One of these places is Kosovo in GSM spectrum. 
In this thesis what we are addressing is how to avoid this problem and bring to 
participants an AGREEMENT that benefits all. With these kinds of agreements, the interference 
can be avoided, saving a lot of money and revenue will increase for both parties: unlicensed and 
licensed mobile operators (including the Government of Kosovo (GK)). On the other hand the 
positive externalities should happen, such a social cost, economical efficiency, political view and 
community integration. 
Our solution is based on Coase Theory and Problem of Social Cost and on another hand 
on the situation in Kosovo based on data from TRA of Kosovo and Serbia also data from Mobile 
Operators from both sides. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Kosovo is the youngest country in the world. It has achieved a measure of independence in 1999, 
and declared itself an independent state on 17 February 2008. The history of Kosovo is such that 
several language and religious groups live in enclaves largely separate from the society that 
surrounds them.  Of greatest sensitivity are the so-called Serb enclaves that are home to Serbian 
speaking Orthodox Christians and are set in a population of Albanian speaking Muslims. The 
residents of these enclaves do not recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo and identify with Serbia, 
located to the north of Kosovo.  This is most acute in the northern part of Kosovo where the 
Serbian population density is particularly high, although enclaves are scattered throughout the 
country. While this has been a concern of the international community and expresses itself in 
many social challenges, this thesis focuses on the aspects of this situation related to radio 
frequency management.  
Kosovo is relatively small (10.908 km2)1 and shares borders with Albania, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Macedonia. Of particular importance is the GSM infrastructure (900 MHz and 1800 
                                               
1 Correct as of this writing, though it should be noted that Kosovo is in negotiation with its neighbors to 
finally demarc its borders.  The outcomes of these negotiations may cause the area of the country to change 
somewhat. 
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MHz). Because of the close proximity of neighboring countries, the presence of signals of their 
national operators can be detected throughout most of Kosovo2 .   
Interference from neighboring countries can be addressed through frequency 
coordination, but the sensitivities are particularly acute with the Serbian enclaves, who do not 
recognize the authority of Kosovo’s telecoms regulator, the Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authority (TRA).  Because of the isolation of the enclaves and their association with Republic of 
Serbia, Orthodox churches frequently set up a GSM operator that is not sanctioned by TRA and 
that homes directly to Serbia.  Because Ahtisaari's plan3 gives these enclaves special political and 
economic status and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) provides active protection to Serbian 
Orthodox churches, including those located in the enclaves, local (i.e., Kosovars) authorities 
have limited rights to access to them even they are not sanctioned. 
If these operators covered only the enclaves with their service, this might not be a big 
problem, but radio waves do not honor political boundaries, so these non-sanctioned service 
providers cover a very large part of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars living in their vicinity.   
TRA has confiscated4 the equipment of these non-sanctioned operators, which are valued 
at several million Euros. TRA claims the right to confiscate them because they are not sanctioned 
and do not have an operating license from them. These unlicensed operators are mainly financed 
                                               
2This can be detected by searching network operator (mobile) by any of mobile phone. 
3 Constitution of Kosovo is based on the Mahtisari Plan: 
http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf 
http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html 
The Assembly of Kosovo is made up of 120 members. 100 of these are elected directly, while 10 members 
represent the Serbian minority, 4 the Roma minority and 3 the Bosniak, Montenegrin, Croatian and Hungarian 
minorities. 2 places are reserved for the Turkish minority and 1 place for Goranci. Serbs have 10 places reserved in 
the Kosovo Assembly, however this number can be increased if they exceed the threshold of 5%. Around 1,6 million 
voters will have voting rights at the upcoming elections. 
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=18482&topicID=32 
4Illegal/unlicensed operators come mainly from Serbia.  Both Serbian and Albanian businessmen are 
involved in their operation. TRA has called the police forces many times to help it disconnect the unlicensed 
operators.  Much equipment has been confiscated in these operations . See TRA-KOSOVO cases: http://www.art-
ks.org/?cid=2,23,103 
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by the Serbian GSM operator5. In some cases, equipment is damaged during seizure6.  When this 
happens, the unlicensed operator’s staff rebuilds their infrastructures as quickly as possible. 
Because of these factors, the usage of GSM frequency bands is substantially outside of 
the control of TRA, which results in interference with and financial loss to the licensed operators 
(IPKO and VALA). The government of Kosovo does not collect tax revenue from unlicensed 
operators, which is a further loss.  Legally, TRA is obliged to protect licensed operators as well 
as the state treasury, so they take actions to shut down unlicensed systems. Because of the long, 
contentious history involving the ethnic Serbs and the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and because 
of the UN and NATO engagement in these areas, great attention is paid to protecting the Serbs’ 
minority rights.  The privileges enjoyed by the enclaves include forbearance of unpaid utilities 
fees (electricity, water) and free services (e.g., education, employment, etc.), 10 guaranteed seats 
in the Kosovo parliament, even if they do not participate in elections. These privileges (which 
are not shared by ethnic Albanians) are guaranteed until the Serbian community is fully 
integrated into Kosovo Society7.  In this thesis, I argue that this privilege should also temporarily 
be extended to telecommunications services, in particular with regard to frequency management.  
From this discussion, it is clear that both the Kosovo government and the unlicensed 
operators suffer financial losses. The question is whether there is a Pareto superior outcome that 
is politically feasible in the context of modern Kosovo.   This question can address interference 
                                               
5This kind of information we can find on each website: PTK- Vala: 
http://www.valamobile.com/index.php?id=505 , TRA : http://www.art-ks.org/ , even on Serbian Telecommunication 
Regulator: http://www.ratel.rs/ 
6TRA has a right to disconnect any unlicensed operator after it has done all necessary procedures, given by 
law of Telecommunication of Kosovo. During the damage that can cause to the unlicensed operator TRA is not 
required to pay compensation. 
7These privileges are derived from the Mahtisari Plan, as mentioned before: placesin parliament given by 
constitution of Kosovo, tax relief and relief from electricity use payments. Source:, government websites, and 
electronics - newspapers also on some un- government society. [You need to find at least one specific reference 
instead of general references like this, even if it is in Albanian]. 
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from the inside (enclaves) or the outside (the neighboring countries: Albania, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Serbia).  
Since the lawful way of addressing this problem (i.e., disconnecting or confiscating the 
equipment) does not solve this problem, the question is whether DSA (Dynamic Spectrum 
Allocation / Assignment), Coasian bargaining, Secondary Users or a kind of MVNO (special 
functions for enclave) might provide practical frameworks for resolving the conflicts. As for the 
border problems, two possibilities seem to emerge:  
• Fixed allocation - equal to the area of coverage and the amount of frequency band 
• Dynamic allocation/assignment if it necessary 
 
1.2 SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT - THEORY 
This section provides a brief overview of spectrum management objectives and 
techniques.  This topic has been discussed in some depth by a variety of authors. 
1.2.1 Why spectrum needs to be managed 
As Cave writes: 
Frequencies are used both commercially, notably for mobile communications and 
broadcasting, and by public sector bodies to support national defense, aviation, the 
emergency services and so on. As demand grows spectrum needs to be managed to avoid 
the interference between different users becoming excessive. If users transmit at the same 
 5 
time, on the same frequency and sufficiently close to each other they will typically cause 
interference that might render both of their systems unusable. In some cases, “sufficiently 
close” might be tens or hundreds of miles apart. Even if users transmit on neighboring 
frequencies, they can still interfere since with practical transmitters signals transmitted on 
one channel “leak” into adjacent channels, and with practical receiver’s signals in 
adjacent channels cannot be completely removed from the wanted signal. The key 
purpose of spectrum management is to maximize the value that society gains from the 
radio spectrum by allowing as many efficient users as possible while ensuring that the 
interference between different users remains manageable8. 
To full this role, the spectrum manager provides each user with the right to transmit on a 
particular frequency over a particular area, typically in the form of a license. Clearly, the 
spectrum manager must ensure that the licenses that they distribute do not lead to 
excessive interference. In practice, this can be a highly challenging task. 
At the highest level of management sits the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations. The ITU’s International Radio 
Regulations allocate the spectrum from 9 kHz to over 275GHz to a range of different 
uses. In some cases these are quite prescriptive, e.g. “satellite”. In other cases they allow 
substantial variation, e.g. “fixed or mobile”. The Radio Regulations also set out how 
countries should coordinate with each other and in the case of global services, such as 
satellite, provides a mechanism for the assignment of rights to individual users. The ITU 
conducts the key parts of its business through World Radio Conferences which are 
typically held every three to four years. These are events attended by thousands of 
delegates from spectrum managers and users around the globe where potential changes to 
                                               
8Martin Cave –The Essentials of Spectrum Management 
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the Radio Regulations are considered9.   In some countries, there are multi-national 
bodies coordinating across a region. For example, this is very much the case within 
Europe where the European Union (EU) and the Confederation of European Post and 
Telecommunication Agencies (CEPT) provide further harmonization. Broadly, these 
bodies can be seen as local versions of the ITU, providing further coordination. Often 
their coordination is more specific, for example rather than simply designating a band as 
“mobile”, they might designate it to a specific standard such as “GSM”. Different bodies 
have differing levels of power. For the CEPT their decisions, like those of the ITU, are 
non-binding but if a country deviates from them it is expected not to cause interference to 
its neighbors as a result. 
Kosovo’s TRA is also under the auspices of the ITU and complies with CEPT, given the 
Kosovo’s desire to align with the EU. In some cases they adapt so-called “beauty contests10” to 
set up the best practice for telecommunication services. 
 
1.2.2 Technology of spectrum allocations 
GSM technologies use a 200kHz channel at the frequency of 900 MHz. The systems are 
designed to a have interference that can be controlled by the operator. Thus, spectrum is 
regulated by frequency assignment to avoid interference. That is, the spectrum is divided up into 
                                               
9http://www.itu.int 
10 In second mobile operator tender “Auction/beauty contest” model in Kosovo means: 
 
- License (basic) price (€20 million) - plus the highest offered bid price (value 30%) 
- The extent of coverage and by when the project would be implemented (value 30%) 
- Local participation – local partnership and management, planned employment (value 20%) 
- Service quality and service range (value 10%) 
- Experience in mobile telephony - number of clients, years of experience, number of markets (10%) 
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discrete parcels of frequency, for example 915–925MHz, and assigned to a particular user. That 
user then expects that they will be given exclusive use of the band. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.111, and has been the system on which spectrum 
management has been based for almost 100 years. 
 
Figure 1-1  Spectrum Allocation[61] 
 
Cognitive and software defined radios are devices which are aware of their surroundings. 
They can monitor transmissions across a wide bandwidth and note areas of spectrum that appear 
to be currently unused. They are intelligent enough to adapt their transmissions to the 
characteristics of the spectrum that they find vacant, using appropriate modulation and coding 
methods. They can detect when the spectrum is being used by its owner and move to a different 
band. Perhaps crucially, they can determine the most appropriate access to the spectrum without 
any central control from a base station. 
                                               
11 Figure from Cave 
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. A SDR (Software defined radio) is a device whose entire operation is defined by 
software. In purest terms this implies that the broadband signal captured by the antenna is 
digitized by an analogue-to-digital converter and from that point on all signals processing is 
performed using software. This would be radically different from current radios where filters and 
mixers are used to select and down-convert small parts of the spectrum prior to its analogue-to-
digital conversion. 
Many forms of DSA use cognitive radio as part of the system. Cooperative DSA systems, 
which do not require cognitive radios, need some additional agreement between operator to use 
the spectrum they want and under what terms (cost/price, time) they agree to operate. Were such 
an SDR developed, it would have the advantage of being extremely flexible. A software library 
could contain information about multiple different technologies and new software could be 
downloaded to the device as technologies changed over time. Having an SDR would make the 
realization of a cognitive radio much simpler, which is why the terms, rather confusingly, have 
been used interchangeably. 
Within traditional management structures the key types of spectrum access are12: 
• Exclusive access,in which a user is given a license to transmit on a particular 
frequency throughout the whole jurisdiction of the regulator (normally a country); no other user 
is given access to the same spectrum with the exception of unwanted emissions. 
• Geographical sharing,in which a user is given an exclusive license but only for 
part of the country. 
• Band sharing, in which different uses are allowed in the same spectrum 
 
                                               
12 From Martin Cave 
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1.2.3 Spectrum Market 
Historically, regulators have assigned frequencies by issuing licenses to specific users for 
specific purposes – an administrative approach. The administrative approach can also be more or 
less prescriptive on the details of spectrum use. Often it has involved specifying what equipment 
a licensee can use and where, and at what power levels it can be used. 
Market methods are being employed both at the primary issue of spectrum licenses, 
when auctions are used and, more significant, by allowing spectrum rights to be bought and sold 
in the lifetime of a license (trading) and allowing a change of use of the relevant spectrum 
(sometimes called liberalization). 
Trading involves the transfer of spectrum usage rights between parties – either the 
government or regulator and a public or private licensee (at primary issue), or between two 
licensees, through so-called secondary, or post-issue, trading. 
A secondary market exists in Kosovo but not for solving the problem at hand13. 
Market failure. Policy aimed at introducing market methods seeks to create markets in 
which prices are as close to costs as possible and where consumers can choose from a wide range 
of services. Fully effective competition is usually only possible where there is competing, 
infrastructures, yet the spectrum-using technology; the markets which they serve and scarcity of 
radio spectrum create restrictions which often mean that an oligopoly, a market served by a small 
number of competitors, is the only possible stable outcome. 
Highly concentrated markets for spectrum-using services often produce adverse consequences 
for end users. The worst form of such market failure associated with market power is a 
monopoly. Anti-competitive behavior, in the form of an “excessive” acquisition of spectrum, can 
                                               
13 Just like MVNO operator 
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be prevented in different ways by the spectrum regulator, which can set spectrum caps or 
establish rules that specify how spectrum trading should take place, including prior approval of 
trades or transfers of spectrum. Equally, a country’s competition regulator (if one exists) can 
attack abuses of power in markets for services which use spectrum, such as broadcasting 
services. 
1.2.4 Spectrum property rights 
When considering possible forms for property rights it is worth remembering that the reason for 
rights is to protect neighbors from interference14. In this case, neighbors can be both 
geographical and in frequency terms.  
The interference that is most common originates with unlicensed operators. Being 
unlicensed, the operators avoid any kind of agreement with licensed operators15.   
Agreements can be economic and/or technical.  A technical agreement can rely on 
international standards. Here, the specification for the technology sets out the signals that a given 
transmitter can emit, and the likely usage defines the density with which transmitters are likely to 
be deployed. The combination of these two yields the interference that neighbors can expect.  
Interference arises from unlicensed transmissions in the same frequency band as well as 
from other sources. Normally, hese are dealt with using public and private enforcement 
processes.  Interference may also come from licensed transmissions in nearby bands or 
geographies, which spill over into the license holder’s band. Interference occurs in all radio 
systems. When a transmission is made on a specific frequency, the energy transmitted normally 
                                               
14 Martin Cave -  ESM 
15 Kosovo case 
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extends across a much broader band. This is shown in Figure 3.4 for GSM where the assigned 
band extends by 100 kHz each side of the zero point, but emissions continue well beyond this. 
The degree to which energy is radiated in neighboring bands can be controlled by 
 reducing the system capacity by lowering the transmitted data rate, which narrows the 
overall pattern of radiated energy, or 
 increasing the system costs by employing tighter filtering. 
 
Figure 1-2  Typical radiation of energy by a cellular transmitter showing overlap into adjacent channels 
 
In-band power - a radio receiver, tuned to a particular channel, will also receive signals 
transmitted in neighboring channels. The neighboring signals will be much reduced in strength 
by the filters in the receiver, but will not be totally removed. 
Another way to reduce interference is DSA because potentially interfering emissions can 
be avoided through the use of detection and agile radios (for example, cogintive radios). This 
method leads to use spectrum more efficient with minor or no interference depending on way 
they are used. Spectrum efficiency leads to increased income for both licensed and unlicensed 
operators: 
 12 
In the case of licensed spectrum, interference can be reduced simply by improving 
technology or better managing spectrum usage. 
 13 
2.0  KOSOVO 
Kosovo is landlocked and borders Serbia to the north and east, the Republic of Macedonia to the 
south, Albania to the west, and Montenegro to the northwest. During classical antiquity, the 
territory roughly corresponding to present-day Kosovo was part of several tribal alliances, 
including that formed by the Dardania16. 
After the Kosovo War and the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the territory came 
under the interim administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), most of 
whose roles were assumed by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 
December 2008. In February 2008 individual members of the Assembly of Kosovo (acting in 
personal capacity and not binding the Assembly itself) declared Kosovo's independence as the 
Republic of Kosovo. Its independence is recognized by 75 UN member states and the Republic 
of China (Taiwan). On 8 October 2008, upon request of Serbia, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the issue 
of Kosovo's declaration of independence. On 22 July 2010, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo's 
declaration of independence did not violate international law, which its president said contains 
no "prohibitions on declarations of independence". 
                                               
16See more on APPENDIX A 
14 
Kosovo represents an important link between central and southern Europe and the 
Adriatic and Black Seas. Kosovo has an area of 10,908 square km. It lies between latitudes 41° 
and 44° N, and longitudes 20° and 22° E.  
The largest citiy is Pristina, with an estimated 500,000 inhabitants. The old city of Prizren is 
towards the south west, with a population of 110,000. Peja/Peć in the west has 70,000 inhabitants 
with Mitrovica/Kosovska Mitrovica in the north at around 70,000. 
North or Northern Kosovo is a region in the northern part of Kosovo with an ethnic Serb 
majority that functions largely autonomously from the remainder of Kosovo. North Kosovo is by 
far the largest of the Serb-dominated areas within Kosovo, and unlike the others, directly borders 
Central Serbia. This has facilitated its ability to govern itself almost completely independently of 
the Kosovo institutions in a de facto state of partition. Although the Kosovo status process had 
repeatedly ruled out formalizing this partition as a permanent solution, it has been increasingly 
mooted amidst continued deadlock. 
According to the Kosovo in 2005 Survey of the Statistical Office of Kosovo, Kosovo's 
total population is estimated between 1.9 and 2.2 million with the following ethnic composition: 
Albanians 92%, Serbs 4%, Bosniaks  and Gorans 2%,  Turks 1%, Roma 1%. CIA World 
Factbook estimates the following ratio: 88% Albanians, 8% Kosovo Serbs and 4% other ethnic 
groups. According to latest CIA The World Factbook estimated data, as of July 2009, Kosovo's 
population stands at 1,804,838 persons. It stated that ethnic composition is "Albanians 88%, 
Serbs 7%, other 5% (Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turk, Ashkali, Egyptian, Janjevci - Croats) (2011 - 
GK is doing registering of population and their economy. 
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2.1 KOSOVO SERB ENCLAVES 
Kosovo Serb Enclaves are the areas of Kosovo where Serbs form a majority, except for 
North Kosovo. While North Kosovo is connected to the rest of Serbia and mostly functions as a 
part of it, the enclaves are surrounded with areas of Albanian majority. Those enclaves tend to 
act as part of Serbia, as they doesn’t accept Kosovo Lawand do not recognize the Independence 
of Kosovo. In most of the enclaves, the freedom of movement for Serbs is limited only to the 
area of the particular enclave but as time passes,  they have started to move freely over all 
territory of Kosova17. 
 
Figure 2-1  Kosovo map, demographic view 
                                               
17See more on APPENDIX A 
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2.2 THE MOBILE MARKET IN KOSOVO AFTER 1999 
 
Based on Appendix A, part 2, and on my experience as ex-employee on TRA-Kosovo, 
the reality that people in Kosovo face every day in the mobile market can be described as  a 
confused or perhaps more strongly as a mess.  Formally, Kosovo has18 two licensed Mobile 
Operators: Vala (PTK), which isowned by Government and IPKO, which is majority owned by 
Slovenia.  In addtion, there are  two MVNO Mobile Operators: Z-Mobile (running on Vala’s 
network) and D3 - Mobile (operating on IPKO).  Those MVNO operators have many fewer usesr 
compared to VALA and IPKO19.    
In the same space and time there are some unlicensed mobile operators that come from 
neighbor states like Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. Most of these unlicensed 
operators come from Serbia. Thesemobile operators have been available will full capacity in 
Kosovo territory20in different period of times.  
Other operators that are unlicensed by GK-TRA that interfere comes from Montenegro, 
Albania and Macedonia21. These operators that interfere in terms of spectrum in Territory of 
Kosovo come from Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. These mobile operators operate in 
their own state but they also push their signal into territory of Kosovo without any support from 
their own states (except for Serbia). 
                                               
18More describe on Chapter of Mobile Market Analysis 
19See more detail on chapter of Mobile Market Analysis 
20 Some of these unlicensed mobile operators has worked or operate as licensed operators mostly in period 
of times that TRA doesn’t work as regulator.  
The period 1999-2004 TRA doesn’t exist.  
Period 2004 -2006 there has been some actions by TRA resulting on interruption of unlicensed operators. 
Period 2006- 2008 TRA doest worked well, and on this period these unlicensed operator has been operate 
without any interruption. 
Period 2008-2011 TRA has done the most actions than ever in terms of interrupting unlicensed operators. 
21Across the borders, without any support from their governments. 
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At this writing, there is no agreement as to how this interference can be reduced or how 
these unlicensed operators could become licensed operators, perhaps as MVNOs.  The objective 
of this thesis is to propose some potentially workable alternatives to rationalize the market to 
policy makers. 
Based on reports by TRA22 , articles by journalists23 , or publications by 
telecommunication professionals, it is clear that all parties suffer under the current arrangement:, 
licensed operators, the Government of Kosovo as well as unlicensed operator (especially those 
operators comes from Serbia)24. 
TRA sometimes causes damage to unlicensed operators when they accidentally damaging 
base station equipment and installations during their enforcement actions.  On April 2010 Mr. 
Ekrem Hoxha CEO of TRA reported that 26 base stations have been cut off25.  Thus, it is clear 
that unlicensed mobile operators suffer losses due to the present conditions.   
On the other hand, licensed operators suffer losses as well. Akan Ismajli, CEO of IPKO, 
said the two operators' estimated revenue losses were EUR170mn (US$217mn) per year and 
that, as well as affecting their profits, there was a significant cost to Kosovo's budget. Also 
Shyqyri Haxha CEO of PTK (Vala) said that there are millions of Euros per year of losses  
caused by unlicensed operators.  These losses persist even after TRA decomissioned unlicensed 
operators, because the operators quickly their infrastructure. This kind of problem is also 
reflected in the politics and relations between the Serbs and Albanians. Remembering that the 
profit that comes from unlicensed operators, Serbian Kosovars businessmen, Serbian from Serbia 
                                               
22TRA website : http://www.art-ks.org/ 
23Some of them are represent  on APPENDIX A- part 2 
24 These mobile operators that have Headquarter in Serbia have some BTS inside of territory of Kosovo as 
we show in Telecom Market Analysis in Serbia chapter 
25APPENDIX A - Part 2 
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businessmen, and Albanian Kosovars businessmen share with each other. It is important to note 
that the Government is not acting against the Serbians who live in the enclaves but against 
unlicensed operator that are based there. From these actions taken from GK- TRA, Serbians 
people lives in enclave many time protest and frustrate.  
From words mention above we can seen that here is happening NEGATIVE 
EXTERNALITIES, that reflect to relation between communities lives in Kosovo even more 
between nations, Serbs and Albanians with no reason because this problem should solve base on  
regulation and economy models or in any solution that benefits for both parties.2627 
For both Kosovo and Serbia there are legal frameworks that allow for resolving this kind 
of problem. Both parties are taking radical steps even if they are legal by laws of the Kosovo or 
Serbian Constitutions. The situation described above calls for middle ground in which all parties 
will benefit.  . This thesis seeks to find a solution using DSA techniques and built on a Coasian 
bargaining framework.  
In recent years (i.e., 2010-2011) two operators who were not licensed by the TRA were operating 
in Kosovo: MTS and Telenor. These were focused on Serbian enclaves and the surrounding 
areas, which included Serb and Albanian communities, and counted some 160 000 subscribers. 
According to the TRA, the average expenditure in the affected regions is about 7 euros/month, so 
the total revenues per month amounts to approximately 1,120,000 euro/month or EUR 
                                               
26Like we are trying to solve. 
27 Base on my experience, remember that I was Engineer on TRA, when we had taken the actions of 
interrupting the service of the unlicensed operator, the people that live in Serbs enclave become frustrate  or let say 
“attacked” by Government of Kosovo because they think that just Serbian mobile operator best fit for them. They 
don’t care even don’t accept Kosovo institution. From most of them (Serbs in enclave) just Serbian mobile operator 
are acceptable. I remember that time, 2006, one of representative of Serbian enclave Rada Trajkovic has complain 
for that has done TRA and more than that with help of President of Serbia and foreign minister of Serbian her 
complain was heard even in  UN -New York ( in one of session of UN conference). This seams crazy but this had 
happen. 
Base on this reality I tried to explain that this kind of solution should be one step toward decreasing 
frustrations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and these need special treatment similar with our solution that 
we are trying to present in this thesis. 
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13,440,000 per year. These revenues are seen by the TRA-licensed operators as lost revenue and 
represents approximately 11%28 of the total mobile revenue they report.  This amount of revenue 
comes out every year from the Kosovo market as a result of illegal operation. TRA has not yet 
found any form approach for recapturing this lost revenue, except for disconnection. 
Revenue is not the only concern of TRA-licensed operators.  If one of their users 
inadvertently roams on one of the networks of unlicensed operators, they are not able to control 
the security of information that passes by these networks, nor are they able to manage the 
experience of their users, which is a key factor in a competitive market.  Further, since 
unlicensed operators do not participate in TRA’s spectrum management processes, planning for 
the quality of the on-net users is also challenging.  TRA (and the government of Kosovo, by 
extension) is also concerned about protecting their national sovereign rights (which, of course, 
are not recognized by these operators, whose license originates in Serbia).  .  Similar concerns 
exist in the border regions with Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and, of course, Serbia. 
The uncontrolled spectrum usage problem applies to the entire spectrum in areas, 
including the enclaves and the border area. It is a particular problem for Kosovo because the 
geographic area of the country is small.  Nonetheless, in this paper, only revenue loss from 
mobile telephony is analyzed, though this lost income may apply to other bands as well. 
 
                                               
28During 2010 total revenue of mobile operator was approx. 140 million Euros based on datasheet above. 
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2.3 LAW ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS - KOSOVO CASE 
After Kosovo war 1999, Kosovo was governed by the UN Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK, which 
set regulations and laws to help the Kosovo Authority rebuild its Institutions. One of these 
regulations was UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 of 25 July 1999, “On the Authority of the 
Interim Administration in Kosovo,” as amended; and UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 
December 1999, “On the Law Applicable in Kosovo,” 
To improve the Telecommunications Sector in Kosovo, UNMIK and PSGK established 
an independent regulatory agency which was responsible for licensing, regulating and 
supervising the providers of telecommunication services in Kosovo, encouraging the private 
sector participation and competition in the provision of services, setting standards for all service 
providers in Kosovo, and, establishing provisions for consumer protection.   The TRA guide by 
law came under Law29 on Telecommunication [59] in Kosovo. 
After PSGK30 and all laws necessary to function as a governmentwere established, PSGK under 
UNMIK created the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunication. Its duties were specified on 
Law of Telecommunication as described below: 
Under Section 3/Authorities and Competencies: 
 
1. The responsibilities for the implementation of telecommunications services in Kosovo 
shall reside in the following entities: 
                                               
29http://www.gazetazyrtare.com/e-
gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=170&Itemid=56&lang=en 
30Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 
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 a) The Ministry shall develop policies for the sector, including the development of 
legislation, and exercising all other powers transferred to it under the Constitutional 
Framework. 
b) The TRA, established as an independent body within the PISG by this Law, shall 
implement the policies of the PISG and Ministry pursuant to this Law, and all other 
implementing legislation enacted pursuant thereto. 
 c) UNMIK, through the SRSG, shall exercise those powers that are reserved to it under 
the Constitutional Framework, including: 
i           The authority to mange publicly owned telecommunications assets, including, but 
not limited to Management of essential PTK assets through the Kosovo Trust Agency KTA in 
cooperation with the PISG pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 on the Establishment of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency of 13 June 2002; 
 ii   Management of radio frequencies, carried out by the Frequency Management Office 
FMO. Some specific administrative functions will be implemented by the PISG and the respective 
independent regulatory body. And 
 iii The regulation of the broadcast industry, which is currently executed by the 
Temporary Media Commissioner TMC.  
2. The TRA shall coordinate all broadcasting activities with the Temporary Media 
Commissioner and with other relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions of the 
Broadcasting Regulation. 
 3. The TRA assign to service provider and users spectrum resources that are specifically 
allocated by UNMIK. 
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4. The TRA shall at its discretion, obtain from service providers and review for
compliance with this Law, international contracts involving the provision of Telecommunications 
Services and equipment between commercial entities active in Kosovo. The TRA shall not 
conclude any agreements with states and multilateral organizations.       
5. the Ministry shall request that the SRSG conclude on behalf of UNMIK agreements
with states and multilateral organizations that pertain to the telecommunications sector, as well 
as all documents pertaining to the SRSG’s oversight of international agreements entered into on 
behalf of UNMIK in the telecommunications sector.  As part of the consultative process in these 
matters, the Ministry may request the right as an interested party to participate in discussions 
and negotiations conducted by the SRSG with states and multilateral organizations that are 
intended to result in the conclusion of such agreements31. 
This is the foundational law for the Telecommunication Sector. Today, FMO and TRA 
are joined and work together as TRA. TRA is now independent from the Ministry of Transport 
and Telecommunication (now the Ministry of Economic Development). 
Chapter 2 Section 4 of the Law of Telecommunication establishes TRA: 
Establishment of the TRA 
1. The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority the “TRA” is hereby established as an
independent, non-profit body within the Ministry, and shall implement the policies of the PISG 
and the Ministry pursuant to this Law, and all other implementing legislation enacted pursuant 
thereto. 
31Italic letters are copied from law of telecommunication in Kosovo. 
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2. The TRA shall promote and facilitate the provision of sufficient and satisfactory 
domestic and international telecommunications services, and other services covered in the 
broadcasting regulations, provided however, that such promotion and facilitation shall not 
extent to free of charge services. 
3. The TRA shall be governed by this Law, and shall observe the need to promote 
universal services in accordance with the principles set forth in Chapter 8 of this Law. 
4. The TRA is authorized to issue regulations and instruction for the implementation of 
the present Law.   
Based on the law that mention above, TRA is responsible for finding a solution for the 
problem of unlicensed operators and spurious transmissions from neighboring states. The TRA 
has the right to proceed, but it seems that the TRA and its engineers prefer the radical solution 
that is suboptimal for all parties (as discussed above).  
Chapter 12 Section 63, 64, 65 of this law (Radio Communications, Spectrum Resource 
Allocation, Numbering), define clearly the duties of TRA related to Spectrum Resources and 
other matters that related to it. 
 
1. The radio frequency spectrum is a limited natural resource.  Frequency management is 
a reserved power by the SRSG, which has made a specific quantum or spectrum resources 
available to the PISG for re-allocation to users and service providers; all provisions pursuant to 
the allocation of spectrum resources in this Law pertain solely to those spectrum resources made 
available to the PISG.  The TRA shall reallocate to service provides only those spectrum 
resources that have been made available to it by the SRSG. 
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 2. In order to protect the efficient and non-interfering use of Kosovo’s radio spectrum 
resources and the rights thereof to orbital positions the TRA shall: 
 a) Establish a spectrum resource plan to allocate radio frequency bands and/or to assign 
radio frequencies for use; 
 b) Allocate such radio frequency bands and/or assign radio frequencies for use; and 
 c)  Supervise the use thereof. 
 3. The TRA’s spectrum resource plan shall become effective after SRSG review and 
approval in writing.  All allocations of spectrum resources by the TRA to service providers must 
be made available to it by the SRSG.  
 4. the TRA shall maintain all relevant information related to the allocation of spectrum 
resources, information on the assignment of radio frequencies, and other relevant information 
required to effectively manage the spectrum resources. 
 5. With the exception of that information which is related to the requirements of Kosovo 
security and/or defense, the TRA shall make the information specified in this section publicly 
available. 
Section 64, 65 and some other parts of this law are contained in  Appendix B under LAW 
of TELECOMMUNICATION. 
By examining the Telecommunications Law, we build a foundation for understanding the unique 
situation in Kosovo. I argue that this Law as well as other aspects of Kosovo (market, theory, 
geography, politics etc,), require a re-thinking on how spectrum might be managed in Kosovo to 
everyone’s benefit.  Further, I argue that it is time to take a Coasian perspecting and consider 
investing in technologies such as DSA as a way to a Pareto superior outcome.   When I mention 
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seems old, I have in my mind that in this law is not specified Dynamic Spectrum Allocation as a 
solution for some special cases. 
 
2.4 TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET IN KOSOVO - MOBILE PHONE 
MARKET 
The link between telecommunications and economic development is well known32. The ITU-D33 
has been evaluating the impact of infrastructure on the development of the information society.   
The diversity of modern telecommunications services helps businesses increase 
productivity by creating more efficient manufacturing and the possibility of coordinating 
activities within and between businesses, which result in cost reduction. Moreover, the 
telecommunications industry itself provides a major source of employment, and contributes a 
significant share to a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Most countries have found some form of regulation of the telecommunications sector 
necessary as a way of coordinating shared resources and ensuring reasonable retail prices.  TRA 
has produced a report34 on status of the telecommunications market, which contains the key 
indicators of market telecommunications.  The document was prepared based on data submitted 
by operators licensed by the TRA that provide mobile, fixed and internet services.  Because of 
data confidentiality, not all indicators reported by the operators are published in this report. 
                                               
32http://www.jstor.org/pss/2677818 
33http://www.itu.int/net/ITU-D/index.aspx?category=information&rlink=rhome&lang=en 
34Market analyses : http://www.art-ks.org/?cid=1,163 
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This document is produced quarterly, so licensed operators are required to regularly 
submit completed questionnaires with the requested to the TRA. This report could be fulfilling 
with additional statistical information from other alternative operators based on Kosovo market 
but this kind of information is based on biggest operators in Kosovo. 
2.4.1 Overview 
The Law on Telecommunications has created the conditions for market liberalization in the 
country. So far all services have been liberalized telecommunication services including fixed 
telephony, mobile, Internet, value-added services, etc.  Specific actions taken by TRA include: 
• Prior authorizations for internet services are released in May 2005 (licensed operators: 
PTK, IPKO, and KUJTESA net). 
• In September 2006 a second license was issued (consortium IPKO / Telecom Sllovenije) 
to offer fixed telephony services on a national level. 
• In the mobile phone market, there are currently two licensed operators (2G): PTK-Vala  
in the 900MHz band, in 2004, and the consortium IPKO / Sllovenije Telecom / Mobitel (band 
900/1800MHz) in 2007. 
• The MVNO Framework was approved by TRA in May 2008 and two operators were 
licensed: Dukagjini Telecommunications (D3mobile), which operates under a commercial 
agreement with IPKOnet, and Dardafon.net (Zmobile) has an operating agreement with 
PTK/Vala. 
Although all telecommunications services were liberalized, full competition currently exists only 
in the Internet and mobile telephony services sector, while fixed telephony services are only 
partially competitive. 
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During 2010, four (4) enterprises providing telecommunications networks and services were 
licensed by the TRA the same as were licensed in 2009.  In total,  
TRA has issued a total of 47 licenses for telecommunication services, which are presented in 
Table 4.1. The licenses apply to the following services, all of which are now offered in Kosovo:  
- fixed telephony services 
- Mobile service  
- broadband services  
- leased lines services  
- Value added services 
 
Table 2.1  Number of authorizations / licenses issued by TRA 
Type of license  Number of licensed operators 
Licenses for mobile telecommunications (MNO) 2 
National fixed services license 3 
Internet services license 13 
International telecommunications services 
license 
5 
The license for international telecommunications 
node and equipment 
5 
License Value Added services 17 
License for virtual mobile services (MVNO) 2 
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Table 2.2   Main Indicators Telecommunications Services Market 
35 
Table 2.2 contains the recent data for the telecommunications market in Kosovo.  Some 
highlights include: 
• During the third quarter of 2010 the number of fixed telephone users  decreased, due to 
the reduction of 4602 users of TK. Number of fixed phone users is estimated to be 88 000, of 
whom 8 000 IPKO alternative operator. 
• While fixed telephony has decreased slightly, mobile telephony and broadband access on 
the Internet have increased in the number of users. 
 
                                               
35  Fixed Telephone lines differ from Fixed Telephone subscriber. While in near past everyone who has 
telephone lines was approximately subscribers. Now most of fixed telephone lines are unused. 
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At the end of the third quarter of 2010, the number of mobile phone users   increased  3.41% 
compared with the previous quarter of this year,  but was up 18%  compared with the third –
quarter of the previous year (2009). 
• The number of users with broadband Internet access remained essentially steady at about 
110 thousand. 
• Revenue from telecommunications services for the third quarter of 2010 are 
€39,325,000.00.  The operators of fixed and mobile networks continue to possess the largest  
market  with approximately 90% of revenue across the sector. Mobile operators’ revenues  are 
82.37% of all income market, while fixed operators accounted for 7.7%. The rest of the revenue 
is from of revenues from Internet services (9.18%), and a tiny fraction (0.74%) from leased lines. 
 
Figure 2.2. shows the division of revenues by activity. 
 
 
Figure 2-2  Breakdown of revenues by activity 
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2.4.2 Mobile phone users 
As shown in the previous section, mobile telephony has grown significantly in the last year and 
captures the lion’s share of sector revenues. The number of mobile phone users grew by 3.41% 
while raising the total to 1.5 million users. Mobile operators have reported that in the third 
quarter (Q3/2010) about 7.000 new users are added to their network. Figure 2.3 shows the 
growth rate of users from the years 2007 to Q3-2010. 
 
Figure 2-3  Number mobile users: 2007-2010 / III 
 
The penetration rate of mobile phone  reached 74.26% by the end of September 2010 , an  
increase of 11.26% compared to the same period in 2009  (Figure 2.3). 
Despite the continuous increase in the number of mobile phone users, the service 
penetration is low compared to other countries in the region as well as the EU. 
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Figure 2-4  Penetration of mobile telephony 
 
 
Figure 2-5  Mobile market shared in different quarter of years 
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2.4.3 Mobile telephony revenues 
Total revenues of the four mobile operators in the third quarter of 2010 were 49.5 million euro, 
which represents an increase of about 20% compared with the previous quarter of this year. 
The trend line of the mobile phone revenue can be seen in Figure 2.6 for the period 2007-
2010, it can be seen that end of 2008 was the first year of decrease revenue of this market 
segment. 
 
Figure 2-6  Revenues from mobile telephony 
 
 
Figure 2-7  Market share of mobile phone based on revenue 
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2.4.4 The structure of mobile phone users 
Structure of mobile telephone users in relations between the users prepaid and contract 
(postpaid) in the third quarter of 2010 continues to be stable. Number of users with a contract in 
relation to the total number of users is very low. About 4% of the total numbers of users 
constitute a contract, while 96% are prepaid users36.  Figure 2.7 presents data on the number of 
mobile phone users, divided into prepaid and postpaid users for the third quarter of 2010. 
 
Figure 2-8  Division of mobile phone users by way of subscription 
 
2.4.5 Telephone traffic 
Figure 2.8 shows outgoing telephone traffic over time as reported by the two network operators 
(MNO) and mobile phone service providers (MVNO), broken down by call type: 
                                               
36 This could be seen quit different of US norms or even EU norms but this happen in Kosovo. Those 
information was taken from TRA: Telecommunication Market Analysis.  
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In the third quarter of 2010, mobile networks originated 441.5 mil-minutes, an increase of 
32.7% compared to the second quarter, and 21% compared to the third quarter of 2009. 
Note that the traffic within the network stayed constant, with92% of calls originating from 
mobile phone users. 
This amount of traffic within the network appears to have come as a result of multiple 
offers and tariff programs that offer calling within the groups with very low tariffs, and calls to 
geographic numbers37 and international calls are a very small part of outgoing calls. 
 
Figure 2-9  Outgoing mobile traffic by destination: 2007-III/2010 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the incoming telephone traffic detail in the networks of the four 
licensed mobile operators according to the origin of the calls.  In the third quarter 2010, traffic on 
wireless networks reached 107.5 million minutes, which represents an increase of 11% compared 
with the second quarter of 2010. 
                                               
37 Geographical number was the numbers that identified town in Kosovo. These numbers was just for fix 
lines. e.g. +381 38 300 300, here +381 country code fro ex-Yugoslavia now Serbia, 38 stands for Prishtina 
capital(39 -Peja town, 28 Mitrovica town and so on) and 300 300 stands for subscriber line. 
Geographical code is similar to city code but dedicated to fixed lines. 
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The data presented in Figure 2.10 shows that that the majority of calls are international 
incoming traffic (over 70%), however, by the end of first quarter, there was a downward trend of 
these calls, while calls from other mobile networks are increased 55% compared to second 
quarter 2010 . 
 
Figure 2-10  Incoming mobile traffic based origin-2010 (in terms of increasing/decreasing per minutes) 
 
2.5 TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR POLICY 
The Vienna Economic Talks – Pristina Meeting was held on 25-26 March 2009 in Grand Hotel 
Pristina in which the Government of Kosovo - Ministry of Transport and Telecommunication 
showed its Telecommunication Sector Policy38 and goals for the telecommunication 
infrastructure. Government of Kosovo has approved this kind of document but also has approved 
                                               
38http://www.vienna-economic-forum.com/332.html 
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two previous document named National Strategy for Information Society 2006-2012 and eSEE 
Agenda Plus. On eSEE Agenda Plus is a regional plan that includes participation from Albania, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. 
Based on this document we can see that the Kosovo Government was and is ready to be 
part of region including telecommunication infrastructure. GK has prepared all necessary legal 
infrastructures in terms of telecommunication strategy.   
In the following text we can see the telecommunication policy goal and then we can 
analyze that to determine if a solution for the unlicensed operator problem (i.e. DSA), is 
consistent with the Government of Kosova strategy. 
2.6 TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY GOALS 
Based on the document that GK presented on 26 of March 2009 in the Vienna Economic Talks 
we can see the following goals. 
- Promote market entry; 
- Promote competition and a level playing field; 
- Achieve Universal Access/services; 
- Ensure optimal usage of scarce resources39 ; 
- Establish a more effective legal framework for the monitoring and supervision of 
the sector that facilitates: 
o efficient and transparent governance,  
o consumer protection, and  
                                               
39This point related to our goal of finding final solution, e.g, kind of DSA technique for main purpose of 
this thesis 
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o Deployment of new, modern technologies and services to meet user needs. 
So from these goals we can see that GK is ready for any solution that fulfills these key 
criteria above. Usage of scare resource, efficiency, legal framework, meets user’s need, customer 
protection are all key words that are consistent with the DSA solution 
2.7 MOBILE SERVICE 
The document mentioned above is related to all telecommunication infrastructure but we are 
interested, for the purpose of this thesis, on the Mobile services and Spectrum goals. 
On the following text we can see the main point related to mobile service that has aggregated 
from this document: 
- All obligations of the PISG40 to honor arrangement dictating monopoly supply conditions 
in the mobile telecommunication sector have ended. The GK41  affirms the following in 
respect of mobile services: 
- Necessary Scarce Resource, such as electromagnetic spectrum, should be made available, 
in an economically efficient manner, for the future development of mobile sub-sector as a 
whole. 
- Processes and procedures administered by TRA for the allocation and assignment of 
radio frequencies for telecommunication network generally, or their reallocation and the 
migration of assignment when called for, shall be transparent, non-discriminatory and 
expeditious. 
                                               
40 PISG - Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
41GK - Government of Kosova 
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- One or more individual Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) licenses may be 
granted, at the discretion of TRA. Such licenses will permit the provision of mobile 
services to end users through technical interconnection with, and access to, facilities of 
exiting holders of mobile services licenses, such that the MVNO can create a separate 
network identity; assume a significant measure of control with users of services in its 
own name. 
- To the extent further completion on mobile services is introduced the initiative should 
come from private sector, recognizing that there is a moratorium o n the issuance of new 
mobile licenses until April 2010. 
- Thereafter, TRA shall promote and facilitate introduction of #G wireless and Next 
Generation Mobile Network (NGMN) networks in Kosova and in that regard may issue 
new licenses for such network to the extent that it determines following analysis that the 
market will support their sustainability. 
So key sentences taken from document mention above, has shown to international and 
vendor  community that GK is ready to fulfill this criteria mention above but a point missing 
here: solution that proposed here on this thesis. 
2.8 SPECTRUM 
In the same way we have taken a part of this document related to spectrum and we can see that 
also spectrum field is treated in same manner like the previous points. 
This point taken from that document is: 
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- The need remains for systematic and consistent approach to issues of spectrum allocation, 
assignment, monitoring and pricing. Such mechanism should ensure that spectrum 
resources are made available in a transparent, predictable and economically efficient 
manner, while at the same time promoting easy of entry of new players and in particular 
the introduction of wireless broadband technologies. Furthermore, once such mechanism 
are in place, ongoing attention needs to be given to their maintenance, effects on 
spectrum users (e.g., coordination of planning and resolution of national and regional 
issues), and their implications and impact. 
- The TRA is directed, as soon as practicable, to conduct a study aimed at producing a rule-
making document concerning the most equitable and transparent mechanism for spectrum 
pricing. 
- Consistent with its responsibilities under the Telecommunication Law, the TRA should 
develop as soon as possible, and to the fullest extent possible, the capability to carry out 
its spectrum monitoring and enforcement functions, and should be provisioned with 
appropriate spectrum monitoring equipment for this purpose. 
Within the applicable limits of Telecommunication Law, the TRA should develop 
relationship with counterpart regulatory agencies in the region on matters of cross-border 
frequency coordination. 
- When spectrum duly assigned  to operators or other users is either unutilized or 
underutilized, the TRA may required the operator or user in question to provide written 
justification for continuing said assignment. In such event, TRA shall review such 
justification and, should the TRA find that the continued assignment of the spectrum in 
question to the operator or user in question is not warranted, the TRA may take action to 
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de-assign the spectrum in question and return it to unassigned spectrum “pool”. 
 
- The TRA shall actively ensure that the national table of frequency allocation and 
assignments for Kosovo stays in line to the fullest extent practicable with European 
Common Allocation Table, including updating the table to align the national with the 
Radio Spectrum Decision (676(2002)EC) and other similar enactment of the European 
Commission. 
- To the extent that the spectrum management and monitoring activities of the TRA require 
technical assistance and extraordinary capital expenditures, the TRA in coordination with 
the MTC42 shall develop the appropriate and justified funding requests. 
This chapter based on the strategy of Government of Kosovo, a review of internal and 
external document of GK43 and meetings with the main officers of telecommunication policy of 
Government of Kosovo. 
Again, even in this chapter the main purpose was bringing in front of readers the strategy of 
GK and showing that, this strategy allow us to bring a kind of solution that we will propose. 
                                               
42 Ministry of Transports and Communication 
43Intern document, I have taken permission for particular information - verbal permission 
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3.0  CONSTITUTION, TELECOMMUNICATION LAW AND A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF 
TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET ANALYSIS OF REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
After reviewing the Kosovo side in terms of law, telecommunication market, territorial 
organization, history and independence, it is necessary to provide a complete picture. Serbia does 
not recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence. In many ways, the different views of the 
legal status of Kosovo form the basis of the problem. 
3.1 REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: THE CONSTITUTION 
Let us take some articles from Constitution of Serbia44   to learn what they have to offer in 
explaining the current situation: 
 
Article 1: The Republic of Serbia is a democratic State of all citizens living within it, 
founded upon the freedoms and rights of man and citizen, the rule of law, and social justice.  
 Article 2: Sovereignty is vested in all the citizens of the Republic of Serbia. Citizen shall 
exercise their sovereignty through a referendum, people's initiative, and their freely elected 
representatives. 
                                               
44For more detail see Constitution of Serbia 
 42 
Article 3: In the Republic of Serbia everything shall be permitted unless it has been 
prohibited by the Constitution and law. Guaranteed and recognized by the Constitution are the 
individual, political, national, economic, social, cultural, and other rights of man and citizen.  
Article 4: The territory of the Republic of Serbia is a single whole, no part of which may 
be alienated. Any change in the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia shall be decided upon by 
the citizens in a referendum.  
Article 5: The Republic of Serbia has a coat of arms, a flag, and a national anthem. The 
coat of arms, the flag, and the national anthem shall be determined under the procedure 
provided for amending the Constitution. The capital city of the Republic of Serbia is Belgrade.  
Article 6: The Republic of Serbia includes the Autonomous Province of Voivodina and 
the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia, these being the forms of territorial autonomy.  
As we can see from these three articles above Serbia considers Kosovo as its autonomous 
province. The articles above mention that “any change of boundaries citizens should decide by 
referendum”. 
Here is one of the main points of problem that we are trying to solve. Serbia believes that 
it has some sovereign rights to Kosovo but not full rights because Kosovo has some kind of 
autonomy given by their constitution. Taken from part VI under- Territorial Organization - The 
Autonomous Province of Voivodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia, we 
can see: 
 
Article 108: The autonomous provinces have been formed in accordance with the 
particular national, historical, cultural, and other characteristics of their areas. Citizens within 
the autonomous province shall autonomously realize the rights and fulfill the duties established 
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by the Constitution and law. The territory of an autonomous province shall be determined by 
law.  
 Article 109: The autonomous province shall, through its own agencies:  
1) enact the program of economic, scientific, technological, demographic, 
regional and social development, development of agriculture and rural areas, in 
accordance with the development plan of the Republic of Serbia, and shall lay down 
measures for their implementation;  
2) adopt a budget and annual balance sheet;  
3) enact decisions and general enactments in accordance with the Constitution 
and law, to regulate matters affecting the citizens in the autonomous province in the 
areas of: culture; education; official use of the language and alphabet of the national 
minority; public information, health and social welfare; child welfare, protection and 
advancement of environment; urban and country planning; and in other areas 
established by law;  
4) enforce laws, other regulations and general enactments of the Republic of 
Serbia, whose enforcement has been entrusted to the agencies of the autonomous 
province, and pass regulations necessary for their enforcement if so provide by the law; 
see to the execution of provincial decisions and general enactments;  
5) establish agencies, organizations and services of the autonomous province, and 
regulate their organization and work;  
6) attend to other business laid down under the Constitution and law, as well as 
by the statute of the autonomous province.  
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The Republic of Serbia may entrust by a law an autonomous province with the performance of 
specific affairs within its own competences and transfer to it the necessary funds for this 
purpose. The autonomous province shall collect revenues as laid down by law.  
 
As we can see, the agencies from autonomies province have some independent decision making 
authority under the Serbian constitution.  
3.2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW - SERBIA 
Let examine some articles in the Telecommunication Law of Serbia45 to help us move forward. 
Under II - GENERAL PROVISIONS - Article 3: 
The principles governing the regulation of the relations in the telecommunications sector are:   
1. To provide the conditions for the development of telecommunications in the 
Republic of Serbia;   
2.  To protect the interests of the users of telecommunications services;  
3.  To create conditions to satisfy users’ needs for telecommunications services;  
4. to promote competition, economy and efficiency in all areas of 
telecommunications;  
5.  To ensure the highest possible quality of telecommunications services;  
6.  To ensure interconnection between telecommunications networks or operators 
on equal and mutually acceptable terms;  
7.  To ensure rational and economical use of radio frequency spectrum;  
                                               
45  For more detail see Telecommunication Law of Serbia 
 45 
8.  To harmonize activities in the telecommunications sector with international 
standards, best practices and existing technical regulations. 
 
Under Powers of Government Authorities in Telecommunications Sector - Article 5 :  
 In telecommunications sector, upon the proposal of the ministry responsible for 
telecommunications (hereinafter Ministry), the Government of the Republic of Serbia 
(hereinafter Government), which has been prepared with participation of responsible authorities 
of the Autonomous Region, defines the policy and strategy of telecommunications development in 
the Republic and adopts the Radio Frequency Bands Allocation Plan. 
 
Both article 3 and article 5 supports our aim toward a solution. In Article 3, each point of 
that direct or indirect kind of solution for Kosovo case: point 2- to protect the interests of the 
users of telecommunications services;, point 2 - to create conditions to satisfy users’ needs for 
telecommunications services; and point 4- to promote competition, economy and efficiency in all 
areas of telecommunications;. 
Point 4 also creates the basis for a solution. The law requires the government of Serbia to 
set policies that promote competition, the economy and efficiency of usage of spectrum46, 
satisfying and protect interest of users, ensuring quality of service and so on. In the following, 
article 5, is shown that Autonomies Region should be a participating in this solution. So even by 
this law we have there is an open door to address the problem of unlicensed operators.  
Under Part II:  REPUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY - 1. Legal Status 
Establishment Article 7: 
                                               
46Here mention efficiency all areas of telecommunication but part of that is spectrum usage in terms of 
spectrum usage and ensuring service for customers. 
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 For the purpose of establishing conditions for efficient implementation and promotion of 
the telecommunications policy  in the Republic of Serbia, the Republic Telecommunications 
Agency (hereinafter Agency) is hereby established as an autonomous and independent public 
organization exercising its authorities in accordance with this Law and regulations adopted on 
the basis of this Law. The Agency is an autonomous legal entity and is functionally independent 
of and not subordinated to any government authority, as well as of any organization and person 
engaged in operating telecommunications networks and equipment or providing services. In 
performance of the activities stipulated herein, the Agency shall ensure implementation of the 
development strategy adopted for the telecommunications sector in the Republic47. 
 
In this article above we can see establishing by law of the RSA and granting it 
responsibility for all kind of policies related to telecommunication. As shown earlier, the same 
applies to Kosovo. Thus, it seems reasonable that two agencies, one from Kosovo and another 
from Serbia both have the legal and constitutional basis for finding a solution for the unlicensed 
operator situation in Kosovo. By law they have the permission as well as the obligation to do 
that. By law they are kind of independent agency in terms of decision that can bring benefits to 
all sides. What seems to be missing is the political will to move the idea beyond every day 
politics.  
At this moment that is writing this thesis, international community has required for both 
part, Kosovo and Serbia to sit down on table and discuss the problems that they should finish. 
                                               
47For more details see : Telecommunication Law of Serbia and Electronic Communication Law 
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One of those pieces of negotiation is of course telecommunication issues. What kind of final 
solutions is going to happen, time will show us48. 
3.3 AN OVERVIEW OF TELECOM MARKET IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN 
2008 AND 2009 
3.3.1 Overview 
Pursuant to the Telecommunications Law, the Republic Telecommunication Agency (RATEL) 
was established as a national regulatory authority (NRA) and an autonomous legal entity with the 
task of ensuring the efficient enforcement and promotion of the policy set within the 
telecommunications sector in the Republic of Serbia, aiming at providing the conditions for the 
implementation of information society and further development of the aforementioned sector. 
The establishment of RATEL created the regulatory framework which served as a basis 
for the upcoming reforms in this sector. From the very beginning of its work, and with the aim of 
introducing new and quality enhanced services as well as consumer protection, RATEL has 
directed its activities primarily towards the accomplishment of provisions set out in the 
Telecommunications Law, regulating the sector based on the principles which would create a 
free and open market, prevent monopolistic behavior and ensure equal treatment and non-
discriminatory status of all market participants49. 
 
                                               
48http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2011-05-18/relations-between-serbia-and-kosovo-may-
become-normalised 
49RATEL - Serbian Telecommunication Agency 
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3.3.2 Regulatory Activity 
 
In performing its regulatory activity during 2009, RATEL adopted and published the 
following bylaws: 
- Rules on radio frequency usage fees (Official Gazette of RS, no. 06/09); 
- Decision on the amount of the annual fee for the usage of assigned numbers and 
addresses from the Numbering Plan (Official Gazette of RS, nos. 16/09 
and23/09); 
- Rules on terms and conditions  for radio and television program distribution 
service provision and contents of the authorization (Official Gazette of RS, no. 
26/09); 
- Instruction on the public bidding procedure for license issuance (Official 
Gazette of RS, no. 12/09); 
- Decision on the provision of call-back service without a special authorization 
issued by the Republic Telecommunication Agency (Official Gazette of RS, 
no. 27/09). 
Let go some further steps that is interesting for our final solution taken from RATEL: 
In accordance with Article 62 of the Law, RATEL prepared Draft Amendments to the 
Radio Frequency Bands Allocation Plan (Official Gazette of RS, nos. 112/04 and 86/08) which 
was forwarded to the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Society (MTIS) for 
further procedures. 
Another part that is necessary taken from Ratel could be this kind of information: 
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During 2009, RATEL adopted, published and made publicly available on its website, the 
following instructions and technical requirements: 
- Instruction on cable distribution systems designing; 
- Technical requirements for cable distribution systems; 
- Instruction on base station designing in mobile telephony systems; 
- Instruction on drafting project documentation for GSM/UMTS base stations in 
public mobile telecommunications networks; (and other issues see50) 
 
3.3.2.1 Radio-communications 
 
The intensive activities related to the joint work of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry 
of telecommunications and Information Society (MTIS), the Republic Broadcasting Agency 
(RRA) and RATEL on preparing the necessary enactments and the creation of conditions 
necessary for analogue to digital switchover in radio and television program broadcasting, 
continued in 2009. 
Moreover, during 2009, the following documents related to RF spectrum management 
were prepared: 
- Draft proposal for the new Rules on radio frequency usage fees with the aim of 
improving the status of radio and TV broadcasters, telecommunications operators 
as well as other radio frequency spectrum users; 
- Drawing-up of Draft Rules on costs for radio station license issuance; 
- Draft amendments to the Radio Frequency Bands Allocation Plan; 
                                               
50Telecom Market Republic of Serbia by Republic Telecom Agency of Republic of Serbia - RATEL  
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- Draft amendments to Frequency/Location Assignment Plan for terrestrial 
analogue FM and AM broadcasting stations for the Republic of Serbia51;   
 
In addition to this, the RF spectrum management also included the following activities 
related to the issuance of radio station licenses, radio frequency coordination and notification and 
RF spectrum monitoring: 
- 8,294 radio station licenses and 370 amateur radio station licenses were issued, 
- 1,570 user requests were resolved; 
- 611 frequency/location coordination were performed; 
- Daily FM and TV broadcast monitoring was performed from the spectrum 
monitoring centers “Beograd” and “Niš”, as well as the periodic measuring 
throughout the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The total number of cases 
processed by radio-emission Controllers reached 1,901 
 
3.3.2.2 Monitoring and Analysis of the Telecommunications Market 
 
In accordance with the 2009 Framework Plan, RATEL carried on with the activities 
pertinent to the analysis and regulation of the telecommunications market. Since Article 9, point 
17 of the Law, stipulates RATEL’s exclusive competencies pertinent to the task of monitoring 
the developments in the field of telecommunications, gathering information from 
telecommunications operators and providing information to users, operators and international 
                                               
51See more detail on Telecom Market Republic of Serbia by Republic Telecom Agency of Republic of 
Serbia - RATEL 
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organizations, the publication “An Overview of Telecom Market in the Republic of Serbia in 
2008” represents one of the results of such market analysis. 
Comparative overview of the number of main lines of the public fixed telecom network, 
the penetration rate of the public mobile telecom network as well as the number of Internet and 
CAT subscribers for 2007, 2008 and 2009, is given in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1  Comparative Overview of the Number of Telecom Service Subscribers in the Last 3 years 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Telecom Market Analysis 
 
In compliance with the Action Plan for the implementation of the Strategy for the 
Development of Telecommunications in the Republic of Serbia from 2006 until 2010 adopted by 
the Ministry of telecommunications and Information Society (MTIS) and pursuant to Articles 9 
and 10 of the Law, in 2009 RATEL conducted the first round of the analysis of the following 
markets: 
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- Fixed telephony; 
- Mobile telephony; 
- Interconnection; 
- leased lines; 
- Internet; 
- Radio and TV program distribution. 
3.3.3 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TELECOM MARKET IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
According to RATEL’s data, the revenues from telecom services in 2009 amounted to 1.51 
billion euro. Since the average annual growth rate of the telecom sector revenues in the period 
from 2005 to 2009 was 13%, this sector is considered to be the most profitable one. The share of 
telecom sector revenues in GDP was around 4.76% (cf. 4.87% in 2008). The total investments in 
the telecom sector in 2009 amounted to 288 million euro. 
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Figure 3-1  Republic of Serbia - Basic Facts 
 
Data utilized for the telecom market analysis in the Republic of Serbia were retrieved 
from the reports submitted by the telecom market participants and refer to the territory of the 
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Republic of Serbia without the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija which is under 
UN administration pursuant to 1244 Security Council Resolution temporarily regulating, inter 
alia, the competencies of the international civil mission in this territory. 
In terms of different services, in 2009, the largest share in the total revenues, 
approximately 55%, goes to the mobile market, whereas VoIP services with 0.04% represent the 
smallest share. 
Accordingly, investments in the mobile market have the largest share in the total 
revenues, 52% in 2009, whereas investments in VoIP only 1%. The structure of 
telecommunications sector revenues is given below (Figure 6.2). 
 
Figure 3-2  Allocation of Revenues and Investments by Services in 2009 
 
It is estimated that the rate of return on investments in the telecom sector amounts to 1.4. 
The acquisition of Mobi63 by the Norwegian operator Telenor along with the procedure for the 
mobile telephony license issuance, which was completed by means of an auction (the value of 
the transaction including additional investments amounted to 1,602 million euro), proved to be 
the best financial investment, whereas the issuance of the third license to Mobilkom Austria 
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mobile operator (the value of the transaction and the investments in infrastructure amounted to 
570 million euro) represents the largest Greenfield investment in Serbia so far. There are 600,000 
employees in the telecom sector and the total value of the sector is estimated to 10 billion euro. 
3.3.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE SEE COUNTRIES 
The countries of the South East Europe include three EU candidate countries - Croatia, 
Macedonia and Turkey, in addition to four Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) 
signatory countries– Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. These countries 
make up for almost 20% of EU-27 population. 
 
Table 3.2  Population and GDP in 2009 of SEE countries 
 
Croatia has the biggest GDP per capital (Table 6.2) which amounts to 43% of the average 
EU-27 GDP, followed by Turkey with the GDP of 30%. The GDP per capita in Serbia and 
Montenegro amounts to 20% of the EU-27 average. 
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The value of VAT in these countries remained approximately the same as it had been in 
the previous year. The highest VAT rate was recorded in Croatia (23%) and Albania (20%), 
followed by Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia (18%) and finally Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Montenegro (17%). The total telecommunications market value in these countries is estimated to 
16.4 billion euro, which is an increase of 4% in comparison with 2008. A particular increase was 
observed within the market segments of Internet, CATV and mobile services. The comparative 
data on the SEE countries’ telecom sector revenues in 2007 and 2008 are given in Table 5 below. 
The largest share, or as much as 60% of the total telecom market revenues, goes to revenues 
from mobile telephony, after which follow revenues from fixed telephony, Internet and other 
services. 
The comparative overview of mobile and fixed penetration in the Republic of Serbia 
(Table 6.3) shows that the number of mobile subscribers in most of the observed countries 
increased in respect to 200852. 
 
Table 3.3  Telecom Market Revenue of Republic of Serbia 
 
                                               
52More detail see on Telecom Market Republic of Serbia by Republic Telecom Agency of Republic of 
Serbia - RATEL 
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3.4 PUBLIC MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AND SERVICES 
Mobile market in the Republic of Serbia continues with a positive growth trend in 2009 
and marks the presence of the following market participants:  
 
- Telecommunications company Telekom Serbia - Mobilna telefonija Srbije MTS, owned 
by Public company for PTT traffic Serbia (80%) and OTE, Greece (20%) (license 
replaced on 01.08.2006) 
- Telenor Belgrade, 100% owned by Sonoco A/S, Denmark, owned by Telenor ASA, 
Norway (license issued on 01.09.2006) 
- VIP mobile (member of Mobilkom Austria Group), owned by Telekom Austria Group, 
Austria (license issued on 01.12.2006). 
 
All three operators were granted licenses for public mobile telecommunications networks 
and public mobile telecommunications network services in accordance with GSM/GSM1800 and 
UMTS/IMT-2000 standards, issued by RATEL. The licenses were issued for the territory of the 
Republic of Serbia, for a period of 10 years, which, upon expiration, may be extended for 
another 10 years without a special request from the operator, provided the requirements under 
the license are fulfilled. 
The Norwegian company Telenor has been present in the Serbian telecom market since 
31 July2006, when, following the successful completion of the bidding procedure, it was issued a 
license for public mobile telecommunications network and public mobile telecommunications 
network services in accordance with GSM/GSM1800 and UMTS/IMT-2000 standards. Through 
this procedure, Telenor also bought the company Mobi63. This has been the biggest direct 
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foreign investment in Serbia so far. Telenor, as a member of Telenor Group which operates 
throughout Europe and Asia, has ownership in thirteen mobile operators, and over 164 million 
users worldwide. Mobile operators in our neighboring countries, Panon in Hungary and 
Promonte in Montenegro, are part of this group as well. In 2007 Telenor began with the 
commercial use of UMTS network enabling video calls and additional services based on high-
speed data transmission. In 2009, Telenor built 883 new base stations. 
 
MTS - Mobilna telefonija Srbije, as a branch of the Telecommunications Company 
Telekom Serbia, was founded in June 1997 and it began to operate through a GSM standard 
based network in August 1998. 
In December 2006, MTS began with the commercial operation of a 3G network with the 
latest HSDPA technology. During 2008, the operation of the 3G network was intensified. The 
number of 3G network subscribers rose significantly, from 490 thousand in 2008 to 
approximately 780thousand in 2009.In addition to the Serbian market, Telekom Serbia is present 
as a mobile operator in Republic of Srpska and Montenegro as well. 
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Figure 3-3  Mobile Operator Telenor Coverage in 2009 
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Figure 3-4  Mobile Operator Telenor Coverage in 2008 
 
Comparing Telenor coverage from 2008 to 2009 we can see that, most of coverage in 
Kosovo territory doesn’t exist anymore in 2009. Another issue that is important to point here is 
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the number of BTS. With red rectangular we point the difference of BTS from 2008, Telenor 
owned 1,820 and in 2009, Telenor owned 2,703. Telenor has increased number of BTS for more 
robust signals53.  
 
Figure 3-5  Mobile Operator MTS Coverage in 2009 
                                               
53 Many of this BTS in Kosovo territory was removed from TRA 
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Figure 3-6  Mobile Operator MTS Coverage in 2008 
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Compare to Telenor, MTS has more coverage in 2009 remaining from 2008 in territory 
of Kosovo. Base on some unofficial data, this coverage is shrinking even more in 2010 and 2010. 
Similar situation we have here in terms of number of BTS. Also MTS has increase number of 
BTS to robust more signals. Base on this situation we have state or solution in chapter 9. 
 
Figure 3-7  Mobile Operator VIP Coverage in 2009 
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Figure 3-8  Mobile Operator VIP Coverage in 2009 
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VIP - mobile operator as we can see is present just in North of Kosovo. Similar to 
previous operators, VIP has increase number of BTS to robust signals. As we treated problem in 
chapter 9 also VIP can be potential competitor for secondary mobile market in Kosovo.  
 
In 2009, Telekom Srbija built 243 new base stations. The third license for mobile 
operator was granted to Vip mobile, a member of the Мobilkom Austria Group present in eight 
European countries, including the following countries in the region: Croatia, Bulgaria and 
Macedonia. 
In 2009, VIP mobile significantly increased the percentage of area and population 
coverage with both GSM and UMTS network signal, having built 535 new base stations. 
In addition to 320 million euro paid for the license, during 2008, Mobilkom Austria made 
considerable investments in the development of infrastructure and hired a large number of 
professionals, thus making the biggest green field investment in Serbia so far. 
The revenues from the mobile network services in 2009 decreased in respect to the 
previous year and amount to 826.74 million euro. Total investments in the mobile market also 
exhibit a downward trend in comparison with the previous year and amount to 13.9 billion euro. 
However, one should note that the decrease in the revenues from the mobile telephony is, 
to ascertain extent, a consequence of calculation, i.e. the difference in exchange rates. In 2009, 
euro had average annual value of approximately 94 dinars, whereas this value was 82 dinars in 
2008. In RSD currency, the total revenues from mobile telephony service amounted to 77.8 
billion dinars, which in an increase of about 4% in respect to the previous year. 
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Figure 3-9  Total revenue from Mobile Telephony (millions of Euros) 
 
As one of the temporary measures aimed at diminishing the effects of the World 
Economic Crisis, the Government of the Republic of Serbia introduced an additional tax rate 
within the mobile telephony sector on 1 June 2009. The 10% tax applies to all calls, standard 
SMS and MMS messages, transmission of data and additional services in the country and abroad, 
whereby this tax is not included in the calculation of VAT. Such a measure resulted in the 
decelerated the growth of the mobile market, even though the operators continued with the effort 
of trying to win over the users by cutting down on prices and introducing a wide range of new 
services, such as SMS directory, favorite numbers, money transfer services, services which 
enable users to buy tickets via mobile phone, downloading music from WAP portals, 
combination of prepaid and postpaid packages, Facebook profile SMS notification, etc. The 
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introduction of the 3G network also meant the launch of new services: real time video calls, 
video streaming, video clips, high- speed Internet, etc54. 
3.5 SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS 
All of the information in this chapter was taken from RATEL - Telecommunication 
Agency of Serbia. In the presentation of this information they performed an analysisof what they 
have done in the telecommunication sector. For us the interesting part was mobile telephony. 
Let us begin our analysis here. It is clear that the Serbian mobile telephone operator 
always invested in the territory of Kosovo even though TRA of Kosovo has interrupted their 
servicesmany times. Moreover, they55 sometimes damaged and confiscated some of the 
equipment during the interruption of mobile services. There is no right by Kosovo law to return 
that equipment back to Serbian Mobile operator because they consider them unlicensed 
operators. This point we have just seen above by way of shrinking coverage. 
As we can see from information above, we have data from two years 2008 and 2009. At 
the same time we have to explain activity of TRA -Kosovo during these two years (2008/2009). 
Based on this information and information that we have about Kosovo mobile market we can 
compare and prove that we said above56. 
On this presentation, in this chapter, we can see that, map of Serbia has included Kosovo, 
not just by constitution but also by telecommunication market - mobile market. In Serbian 
territory there is three Mobile Operators, Telenor, MTS and VIP Mobile Operators.  
54For more detail see in Telecom Market Republic of Serbia by Republic Telecom Agency of Republic of 
Serbia - RATEL 
55 TRA- officers, engineers and staff, responsible for that job 
56 Serbian mobile operator always invests in Kosovo even their equipment has destroyed many times. 
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From the map coverage, we can see that Telenor on 2008 has more coverage than 2009. 
Why this happen? Because of TRA actions! MTS is in the same position. In 2008 has more 
coverage than 2009. But MTS has not lost a lot of coverage compare to Telenor. This comes 
from that MTS has more robust structures in terms of human resource that support it.  MTS had a 
strong support from Kosovars non-legal businessmen57. This means that their business comes 
from unlicensed operators and as such their businesses are not registered with the appropriate 
Kosovo Authority.  The Kosovar Authority doesn’t accept this situation.  
VIP operator has coverage just in North of Kosovo. Authority of Kosovo there is very 
weak. 
Another issue that I want to emphasis here is that, in all conclusion and market analysis 
that Serbian Government have done through RATEL, Kosovo territory was present in the map of 
Serbia or as they called Kosovo and Metohija.  
However, this information from both sides Kosovo and Serbia in terms of mobile 
telephony market analysis is very important for this thesis. This bring in front of us another 
strong argument to clarify the real situation in Kosovo for mobile market and then to facilitate us 
the way of finding or recommending a right solution for this problem in terms of which solution 
should be benefits for all “players in the game”, that are mobile operator for both sides Kosovo 
and Serbia, and the end Government of Kosovo through Telecommunication Regulatory Agency 
-TRA of Kosovo. 
                                               
57 They could be Serbian Kosovars or Albanian Kosovars. 
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4.0  THE CURRENT STATE OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT IN KOSOVO 
At present, there is no agreement with neighboring states on the coordination of 
frequency bands, resulting in significant interference problems.  This is especially pronounced in 
the mobile radio bands of 900 MHz and 1800 MHz. Because the territory of Kosovo is relatively 
small (10.908 km2), signals from neighboring operators from the countries of Albania, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia can be detected almost everywhere in the territory of 
Kosovo (Another source of signals in the 800 and 1800MHz bands are transmitters in the 
Serbian enclaves that are not licensed by TRA).  These enclaves have been afforded special 
political and economic status under Ahtisaari's plan, and their populations maintain stronger 
relationships with people and businesses in Serbia than Kosovo.  Apart from the northern part of 
Mitrovica, there are a significant number of Serbian enclaves in Kosovo.  The Serbian Orthodox 
churches, new or old (the newly constructed) located in the Serb enclaves, are afforded even 
greater protection because the religious tolerance in Kosovo is very good and because these 
churches are protected by KFOR. In many cases, these churches also house the antennas and 
equipment of the unlicensed operators.   Because of the special protections, local authorities have 
very limited rights to access to them even they are considered illegal. Because of the location of 
the Serb enclaves, these illegal antennas cover a very large part of Albanian-speaking Kosovars 
population.  
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As documented in Appendix, TRA has taken action against these unlicensed operators by 
confiscating their equipment, valued at several millions of. TRA asserts the right to confiscate 
them because they consider them to be unlicensed, and therefore illegal, operators. The operators 
that operate without licenses are mainly financed by the Serbian GSM operator. Every time that 
TRA inadvertently damages the GSM equipment (BTS and so on) during its disconnection, their 
staff of the unlicensed operator is able rebuild their infrastructures immediately58 . 
Because of these factors, frequency usage in Kosovo can be said to resemble the “wild 
west”.  This comes at a cost, because the unlicensed operators interfere with the operations of 
TRA-licensed service providers, who have made capital and operational investments in their 
systems.  These operators (i.e., IPKO and VALA) are recording financial losses as a result.  
Since they have no enforcement authority, they turn to TRA to resolve the conflict59. Due to the 
accidental damage to the equipment during disconnection, the unlicensed operators also suffer 
losses.  Finally, the Government of Kosova does not collect taxes from the unlicensed operators, 
resulting in diminished capabilities to address the needs of the country.  
Because of the tragic history between the Serbian and Albanian members of the Kosovar 
communities, the Serbian enclaves have been granted special privileges as a minority community 
(e.g. non-payment of electricity, water and other administrative services, education, employment, 
etc., even providing 10 places in the Kosovo Parliament, without the need to participate in 
elections).  These privileges were granted with the hope that this minority will someday integrate 
to Kosovo society  At that point, these privileges will no longer be necessary. 
                                               
58We can see on TRA website: http://www.art-ks.org/ on news page also in RATEL web page: 
http://www.ratel.rs/information/news.134.html?article_id=894 -Serbian telecommunication regulatory, part of 
statistical information are used on chapter 6 of this thesis. 
59  TRA have authority but can’t apply it in whole territory of Kosovo because of political status of Kosovo. 
TRA tried to find a radical solution. For that till now the problem still exist. The smooth solution should be DSA 
method, TRA doesn’t have courage to do that at least till now(2011). 
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In this context, it is worth evaluating whether these special privileges should also extend 
to the field of telecommunications services, especially with regard to frequency management.  
Given that all parties in this dispute are suffering losses, it is useful to examine how this 
spectrum management problem might be solved so that a Pareto-superior state might be 
achieved. There are at least two sub-cases that should be considered: the problem related to the 
Serbian enclaves and the problem related to adjacent countries. 
It is clear that the approach taken in the first case, disconnection of the unlicensed 
operators, does not achieve this goal.    This thesis will consider a Coasian bargaining framework 
as a strategy for moving forward and evaluate whether some of the dynamic spectrum 
assignment (DSA) techniques that are emerging might be helpful.   Finally, authorizing an 
MVNO for the Serbian enclaves would have the effect of internalizing the frequency 
coordination externality and may lead to a Pareto-superior solution if it is politically acceptable.  
Kosovo is not unique in being a small country that borders on several other countries 
(examples include Luxembourg, Moldova, Armenia and Slovenia).  It is possible that lessons 
from these countries could be applied to Kosovo.  Typically, solutions to these problems include 
frequency coordination and careful design of antenna patterns to minimize cross-border 
interference. 
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5.0  SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 
The starting point of spectrum coordination functions must be fixed spectrum 
allocation/assignment/access (FSA).  Similarly, it is instructive to examine existing spectrum 
coordination practices among countries with shared borders.  
Arrangement F [16] is the arrangement between the Department of Communications of 
Canada and the Federal Communications Commission of the United States concerning the use of 
the Band 806 to 890 MHz along the Canada - United States border.  This is a useful reference for 
this work, as it has been for other states around the world in terms of sharing spectrum. 
This arrangement between the Department of Communications of Canada (DOC) and the 
Federal Communications Commission of the United States (FCC), herein referred to as the 
Agencies, covers the establishment and operation of land mobile radio services operating in the 
band 806 to 890 MHz along the Canada - United States border. 
 
5.1 GENERAL SHARING PRINCIPLE 
The frequency band covered by this arrangement and each of the sub-bands are to be 
shared on an equal basis along the border, except as otherwise specified. 
 Sharing Arrangements in the 806-821 MHz and 851-866 MHz Bands 
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The United States has the unrestricted geographic use of the frequency bands 806.0000 to 
809.7500 MHz, 817.2500 to 821.0000 MHz, 851.0000 to 854.7500 MHz and 862.2500 to 
866.0000 MHz in the Sharing Zones within the United States. 
Canada has the unrestricted geographic use of the frequency bands 809.7500 to 817.2500 
MHz and 854.7500 to 862.2500 MHz in the Sharing Zones within Canada. 
There are three Sharing Zones: 
 Sharing Zone I: 
This Sharing Zone is the area adjacent to the United States-Canada border East of 
longitude 121º 30'W and extending a distance of 100 km within either country.  
Within this zone, the Agencies may use their allotted portions of spectrum subject to the 
Effective Radiated Power (ERP) and Effective Antenna Height (EAH) limits of Annex A [16] 
Sharing Zone II: 
This Sharing Zone is the area adjacent to the United States-Canada border between 121' 
30' and 127ºW longitude and extending a distance of 140 km within either country. Within this 
zone, the Agencies may use their allotted portions of spectrum subject to the Effective Radiated 
Power  (ERP) and Effective Antenna Height (EAH) limits of Annex A, Table A2[16]. 
Sharing Zone III: 
This Sharing Zone is the area adjacent to the Alaska-British Columbia/Yukon Territory 
border and extending a distance of 100 km within either country. Within this zone, the Agencies 
may use their allotted portions of spectrum subject to the Effective Radiated Power (ERP) and 
Effective Antenna Height (EAH) limits of Annex A, Table Al. [16] 
Protection Zone: 
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The Protection Zones are the areas adjacent to Sharing Zones I and III extending from 
100 to 140 km away from the United States-Canada border within both countries. There is no 
Protection Zone associated with Sharing Zone II. 
 Each Agency has full use of the 806-821 MHz and 851-866 MHz bands within the 
Protection Zone in their respective country subject to the condition that base stations not exceed 
the maximum Effective Radiated Power (ERP) and Effective Antenna Height (EAH) limits given 
in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.1 Canada/USA states sharing agreement 
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Figure 5-1  Sharing Zone USA –Canada 
 
Table 5.2 Limits of Effective Radiated Power (ERP) Corresponding to Effective Antenna Heights of Base 
Stations in the Protection Zones and Sharing Zones I and III. 
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The US and Canada are both large countries with few borders, so it would be useful to 
consider the arrangements of a small country (like Kosovo) with many borders. For this case, we 
consider Guatemala as documented by the ITU. In terms of territory Guatemala can be similar 
case to Kosovo, albeit with fewer problems in terms of Spectrum Management. 
They use auctions for Mobile Spectrum Band as many countries around the world do. 
Also they use ITU recommendation as many new countries do. 
 
Figure 5-2   Map of Guatemala 
 
The spectrum allocation and coordination system of Guatemala changed dramatically 
with the “Ley General de Telecomunicaciones” of 1996.  Allocation of radio spectrum evolves 
from the bottom up. Private action comes first: any person or company, national or foreigner, 
may request any spectrum band not currently assigned to other users.  When conflicts arise 
caused by interference from signals of adjacent bands and/or inter-modulation distortions private 
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parties are encouraged to mediate between themselves.  If private mediation fails, specific rules 
are enforced by the telecommunication regulatory body. Additionally, the injured party may sue 
for damages in existing courts in terms of Radio Spectrum Management after the 
Telecommunication reform 1996 they have state Títulos de Usufructo de Frecuencias (TUF)  that 
may be leased, sold, subdivided or consolidated for a limited period (fifteen years). In fact, the 
TUF may be even used as equity exchanged for investment[17].  
By using the TUF Guantemala regulatory tries to follow ITU recommendation as many 
international states do. The TUF was the first step toward ITU recommendation.  
The physical TUF is a security paper certificate listing the six following basic variables 
on the front:  
• Frequency band;  
• Hours of operation;  
• Maximum power transmitted;  
• Maximum power emitted at the border of adjacent frequencies;  
• Geographic territory;  
• Duration of right (beginning and ending). 
The independent regulatory body established by the 1996 law, the Superintendencia de 
Telecomunicaciones (SIT) is responsible for the TUF registry. This computerized database is 
easily accessible to the public.  Anyone may request a copy of the TUF inventory. 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Croatia were also examined from the perspective of 
spectrum coordination.  They all base their practices on ITU recommendations, yet no one faces 
the problems found in Kosovo. 
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6.0  SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS FOR KOSOVO 
In the previous chapters, we have examined   Kosovo history, the Law of 
Telecommunication, spectrum theory, the spectrum market of Kosovo and Serbia.  In addition, 
we have examined otherproblems related to the inefficient usage of spectrum related to the 
mobile market and have reviewed the literature.  Here, we apply these various aspects to 
spectrum management in Kosovo with particular attention to mobile telephony. The goal of this 
chapter is to make recommendations for spectrum management in Kosovo. 
It seems that all of the countries mentioned above normally carry out their activities 
within the ITU framework, which leads to bilateral and multi-lateral agreements harmonizing 
spectrum use across national borders. Some of these international activities include the ITU 
World Radio Conference (WRC) and related Regional Conferences and Study Groups. Unlike 
the countries studied in the previous chapter, Kosovo is not yet member of the ITU. Thus, the 
problem in Kosovo should be temporary; the main objective of this thesis is to find a 
temporary/transitional solution that will lead to a permanent solution that is beneficial for all 
parties. 
Before modeling our solution for Kosovo case let us review briefly what we have done till now. 
In a first chapter we introduced the real situationin Kosovo, then, we’ve introduced the 
Law of Telecommunication of Kosovo, which are based ITU recommendations or CEPT 
standards.  Next, we introduced some theory related to Spectrum Management. It is needed to 
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begin from a basic theory from this field up to advance research till up-to-date to have better 
picture for addressing the problem that we are treating. Related to basic theory of spectrum 
management the Martin Cave Book is a useful guide for this field. 
In the Fourth chapter we introduce the Kosovo Telecommunication Market. In this 
chapter, we present some analysis related to the telecommunication market in Kosovo. This 
analysis relied on analysis that was performed by TRA with some feedback from IPKO and 
VALA as well as additional sources. The aim of this analysis was to present the 
telecommunication market in Kosovo.  Based on that, we can determine the revenue as well as 
the loss of income with and without solution proposed here. Base on this analysis on this chapter 
and on a similar analysis of the Serbian side (chapter 5), we can see clearly that our solution is 
efficient not just for Kosovo but also for Serbia and the other neighbor states i.e. Albania, 
Macedonia and Montenegro. 
Then, we present Telecommunication Sector Policy. The Government of Kosovo 
periodically presents its own strategy.  This strategy of Government of Kosovo support ITU and 
CEPT recommendation and as such, was drawing up with cooperation of international 
community’s related to telecommunication standards. Also this strategy support strongly a 
solution that is efficient and benefit from both parties in an indirect and direct way toward 
Kosovo case. In this way our solution should have support on solving the problem of Kosovo 
toward telecommunication issue. 
In the same chapter we introduce Constitution, Telecommunication Law and a brief 
overview of Telecommunication Market of Serbia. As we describe inside this chapter, 
constitution, telecommunication law allow us this kind of solution.  Even though Serbia does not 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state, it considers it as its part.  As a result, through its 
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Constitution and Telecommunication Law, there is a framework for a solution for Kosovo 
frequency management problem. Specifically, Articles 108 and 109 of Serbian Constitution 
define some autonomy in decision making for Kosovo. The data on the telecommunication 
market that was presented in this chapter shows how the numbers of BTS of some mobile 
operator were reduced from 2008 to 2009. Based on our analysis in the previous chapter this is 
known to be the result of TRA actions and not enough support from international communities60. 
Toward this, our solution suggests better solution than this one actually is.  
Let us return to present situation in Kosovo and consider the spectrum usage problem.  It is 
useful to separate the solutions to this problem into (1) Internal - area that is inside the country’s 
borders, where interference comes from internal unlicensed operators and (2) external - 
interference that comes across national boundaries. 
The red points in fig 9.1 represent the main Serb enclaves that have GSM transmitters 
(BTS or a radio link transmitter to smaller BTS) that can cover most of Kosovo’s land area. The 
chronology of the TRA’s interaction with the unlicensed operators was presented in Chapter 2, 
and Chapter 5 addressed the telecommunication markets in Kosovo.  Thus, we can clearly see 
that there is a huge cost and loss revenue for both sides in the internal frequency coordination 
problem. As we have state before, Kosovo is independent state and as such GK61 consider 
unlicensed operator MTS, Telenor and VIP and some other mobile operator that interfere from 
outside boundaries, but they still operate and still produce interference until the political problem 
will close for long time or forever. This operator doesn’t apply for license as others done. 
                                               
60 Actions taking by TRA for interrupting services of unlicensed mobile operators 
61 GK - Government of Kosova 
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TRA have all necessary laws to proceed with finding a solution. It has permission from 
GK and from internationally communities at least to give a temporary solution (like I will 
propose) to avoid this essential problem that involve all internationally community even USA.  
 
 
Figure 6-1  Terrain Map of Kosovo with unlicensed coverage by Mobile Operator on Serbs Enclaves 
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6.1 PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING INTERNAL INTERFERENCE 
Let us revisit Coasian Bargaining62. We considered two different cases:  “Crops versus Cattle” or 
“ RuralNet Corp. Vs  CityConnect Corp”. Note that Coase also explained the role of positive and 
negative externalities. Until now we have only seen the negative externalities produced by this 
problem in Kosovo. 
Following Forde and Doyle, let assume that RuralNet Corp = Serb Enclave operators (MTS, 
Telenor or VIP) (each red area of Serbs enclaves has a common manager that we will call 
Manager A). On another side letCityConnect Corp. = License Operator (Vala or IPKO) 
(which we will call Manager B). So let say we have two “Managers” A and B that cause 
interference to each other and, at the same time, cause infrastructure damage and lost revenue to 
each other63. We know that GK supports TRA the operators that have a license through so in this 
case GK-TRA supports Manager B. 
The problem then becomes how “Manager A” can bargain with “Manager B”.As we mentioned 
before, the Serbian Community has some special rights. Let assume that these rights are listed 
below that must be considered in the bargaining problem and suggest some preconditions: 
 Manager A is free for spectrum assignment fee.  
 Manager A doesn’t need a license for his territory. (Normally License for GSM cost a lot 
of money) 
 Manager A in cooperation with license operator can lease all necessary equipment to 
provide cell phone service. 
                                               
62 Forde and Doyle’s paper 
63 MTS damaged caused by TRA and IPKO damaged caused from some unknown people as reaction of 
MTS damaged - this was reality 
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 Manager A can lease land(spectrum) of Manager B for period of time through a 
bargaining process; in this term Manager A is not bound justto his area (like before). 
 Manager A’s users should pay taxes to Manager B like all Manager B’s users 
 Manager A should pay tax on revenue to Manager B (it can be for 1 or 2 years and then 
no tax revenue till end of transition period) 
 Manager A and license operator should communicate with each other to avoid 
interference. They are free to bargain with each other for any kind business under TRA 
approval. (They can do MVNO for particular space) 
Forde and Doyle examined two cases to develop the experimental methodologies related to the 
cellular network. Those cases are a California City and a Hoboken NJ, both of which have a high 
population density so they have a large number of cell phone users. 
We have seen that even when there is high demand for cellular service, there are 
spectrum holes that can be used for secondary service (it can be secondary user or like MVNO 
user). We can assume that the same in Kosovo because there are fewer users and less demand. 
There is actually enough room in the GSM band in Kosovo for two more Cellular Network 
Operators (2 x 900 MHz and 2 x 1800 MHz). We can use an analogy between Kosovo and 
California and NJ cities for further analysis. The approaches that have been proposed to these 
cities can also be applied in the Kosovo case. This can be a solution of problem, do bargain as 
MVNO operators, but let’s go deeper with our analysis on models in the following. 
It is important to remember that, in the Kosovo case, there is not just technical problem.  
Instead, we must consider the political, economical, technical and strategic concepts as well 
when trying to find the best solution for the Kosovo case. Also, the time horizon of the solution 
(i.e., 5 - 15 years) depends on the political reality. 
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6.1.1 MODEL 1 - Internal Problem 
Considering the Coasian Bargaining procedures, Manager A should start negotiation with 
Manager B about sharing spectrum around the red zones 64(fig.1.1).  
Each Party should consider revenues and loss during all period of providing service. They should 
bargain on real business interest and procedures. After they reach agreements they should inform 
TRA for further procedures65. 
Let us focus in more detail on the Coasian bargaining analysis. As we know MTS66 is present in 
almost all Serbs enclaves. The same is true for Telenor. Let manager A be for MTS negotiation 
and Manager B for IPKO67.  
Let recall the figure from the Forde and Doyle paper: 
 
Figure 6-2  Rural Vs City Network [58] 
 
                                               
64 Red zones = Serbs enclaves 
65 IPKO has right to have subcontractor to expand its service. Base on that TRA should agree on this 
potential agreement if this is going to happen. 
66 Let the MTS mobile operator be a subject of purpose 
67 IPKO as we mention earlier is second Mobile Operator in Kosovo 
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Let MTS operates in Zone A and IPKO operate in Zone B. In reality MTS has few users in zone 
B and IPKO has few users in Zone A. Any of operators can’t offer service outside of their 
zone.For our purpose of this thesis, let us make some numerical assumptions that could be scaled 
to actual values. 
Let MTS have 10 000 users in Zone A. Let IPKO have 30 000 users in Zone B. At the same time 
let MTS have 2 500 users in Zone B and IPKO have 3 000 users in Zone A. 
 
Table 6.1  Numbers of users per zone 
Zone A Zone B 
10 000 MTS users 30 000 IPKO users 
2 500 IPKO68 3 000 MTS user 
 
By law69, Zone A, zone of Serbs enclave inside of Kosovo belongs to Zone B, to licensed 
operator, in this case IPKO and, based on that, MTS should be more liberal on bargain 
procedures.  
Let us assume that MTS can collect 5 euro/month/user and IPKO 7 euro/month/user. In 
the normal condition of operation, MTS collects 50 000 euros/month from zone A and loses 15 
000 euros/month from zone B70. On the other side IPKO can collect €210 000/month from zone 
B and loses €17 500/month from Zone A71. 
Let us further assume that, due to interruptionsby TRA to MTS, the MTS network is unavailable 
at least for 2 months per year. If we convert this unavailability to monetary amounts, this works 
                                               
68 If not actual user, they are potential user. 
69 Spectrum that is used by MTS belongs to IPKO. IPKO has license fro that spectrum from TRA. 
70 Let assume that MTS can’t reach zone B, if it will reach the TRA will be aware and interrupt the service. 
In many cases this was the main reason of interrupting. 
71 Let assume here that IPKO can’t install BTS near to Serbs enclave for security reason of damage as in 
north was happen. 
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out to€100 000 + €30 00072 (this sum if our solution work) = €130 000 per year. In the same time 
damage of the equipment that TRA can cause is around €300 000 per year. This equipment is 
confiscated and can’t return to MTS base on law that doesn’t allow it. In this way if we do 
simple calculation in terms of how much MTS can collect over a year is: 
12 x €50 000 = €600 000 total income 
2 x €50 000  = €100 000 loss from network interruptionsfor at least two month/year 
€300 000 damage with/or confiscating equipment from TRA 
€600 000 - €100 000 - €300 000 = €200 000 per year revenue from MTS73. 
 
Table 6.2  Total loss from both operators 
Euro per year From MTS From IPKO 
Interrupting 100 000 / 
Damage 300 000 / 
Unable to provide service   180 00074   210 00075 
Total loss for Mobile Operator 310 000 210 000 
/ / / 
Total loss from both operators 520 000 euro per year 
 
Recall that in chapter 4, we discussed the telecommunication market survey in Serbia that was 
done by RATEL.  In this, we saw the reduced number of BTS in the territory of Kosovo. 
                                               
72 3000x5x2(month) 
73 This could be negative externalities  
74 3 000 user x 5 euro/month = 15 000 /month = 180 000 per year from Zone B 
75 2 500 user x 7 euro/month =  17 500 / month = 21 000 per year from Zone A 
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Other negative externalities could be that people living here often may not have a connection 
through mobile phone, which has economic costs and can increase the frustrations between the 
communities. 
Let us calculate the total loss for both zones A and B in this scenario. 
We should remember that in this scenario GK also suffers losses from uncollected value 
add taxes(16 % in Kosovo), which is another negative externality. 
Further considerations include the maintenance costs for. Let assume that MTS 
spends€100 000 per year for its network, including human resource, BTS maintenance and so on. 
So the final pure revenue for MTS is €100 000 /year, on which MTS does not pay VAT to GK 
through TRA.  
On analyze above we have seen that it benefit to have Coase bargaining. It will benefit 
also if we thin on DSA approach, as we know these radios doesn’t exist yet 
If this agreement that we explained above (”Coasian Bargaining”)happens, the MTS will 
have the following situation. Based on table 9.1, the total MTS users will become 13 000(10 000 
from Zone A and 3 00 from Zone B). From this we can do simple calculation: 13 000 x 5 
euros/month = 65 000 / month = 780 000 euros/year. Let assume that this business will be legal 
from the perspective of GK76 and 16% of this amount will go to GK as Value AddedTax. The 
amount of 16% of 780 000 is 124 800 euro /year. Another tax is related to profits that we’ll 
assume is  10%, or €78 000 / month. Let assume that X%77 of the €780 000 belongs to IPKO for 
offering cooperation with MTS via a negotiated agreement. On the other side based on this 
                                               
76 This can happen in a way that IPKO is free to join with any operator in band that he received license. It is 
able to receive any service from company as a supporting. IPKO should just to respect the license agreement. 
77 This X% let it be as variable number that we should calculate under which value MTS should accept the 
DSA , cooperative sharing with IPKO. 
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agreement IPKO will have another 2 500 user in Zone A; in terms of income this means €2500 x 
7/ month = €17 500/month = €210 000/year. 
Now based on calculation above, let us do some analysis.. First let us find the upper and lower 
bounds of factor Xso that MTS management would accept the agreement with IPKO. In another 
words, let us find the factor X value that benefits MTS: 
Total income: €780 000/year 
Tax Value Added 16 % : €124 800/year 
Total another TAX78 - 10%:  €78 000/year 
 Spectrum usage from MTS that belongs to IPKO79(or amount of money that IPKO will accept to 
cooperate with MTS) is factor X: X% 
€780 000 - €124 800 - €78 000 = €577 200 - This amount is total incoming after paying taxes. 
Let find X: 
€577 200 - X = €200 00080 = €377 200 euro/year 
ܺ%100 = 377	200780	000 ௬௜௘௟ௗ௦ሱ⎯⎯⎯ሮ 	ܺ(%) = 377	200780	000 ∗ 100% = 48.3581	%	 
Thus, we havefind that X%: 0 ≤ X < 48.35.Based on Coasian Bargaining, MTS 
benefitsfrom reaching this agreement as long as X is in this range. 
The MTS operator tries to keep X as low as possible, similarly, IPKO tries to get it as 
high as possible. In this case factor X  we can name as a Coasian Bargaining factor that is a key 
factor for establishing an agreement. 
                                               
78 Tax in Profit and related to it, maintenance of selling point etc ...(without BTS maintenance and other 
issues related to network) 
79 Here IPKO is doing kind of reselling frequency band. 
80 This amount is total income in a scenario without agreement. 
81 This % is per year of total incoming per year 
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Even if MTS will pays nothing to IPKO (X=0), this still benefits  IPKO because IPKO 
has additional usesr and revenue (€210 000 per year in Zone A). 
On the on another side, IPKO can pay MTS up to €200 00082 per year. IPKO should offer 
mobile service to the users of Zone A with the same price as MTS has done83. In this way 
IPKO’s benefit is €10 000 /year with no interference from MTS; on another side, MTS has€200 
000 total income, so it84 can save €100 000 /year from BTS maintenance of and other issues 
related to their network.85 
This analysi shows that, based on a model of the current situation, that both parties can 
benefit if this agreement is reached. 
The analysis above has treated just one Serbian Enclave. In Kosovo there is more than 
one , andthe northern part of Kosovo is totally ungoverned by Kosovo Institutions. This model 
should also work also for the other enclaves and for Northern Kosovo. 
For internal solution we focused just on Coase Bargaining. Other modes of sharing, such 
as using DSA technologies, could work as well, but this is not the main focus of this Thesis.  
Nonetheless, we have presented a brief discussion of this in an Appendix. 
The model that we described above could be accepted by GK because it will produce 
positive externalities for them as well as the operators in the Serbian enclaves.86Another positive 
externality is the increased income for the GK budget. The number of IPKO user will increase 
and the other income factors calculated above in terms of amount of money will increase the GK 
budget. This could be a step more toward a normalized situation in Kosovo.  
                                               
82 Remember that this amount is total amount that MTS can collect from Zone A 
83 Here was assumed that if user will spend 7 euro per month if not then IPKO can offer MTS less than 200 
000 euro per year 
84 MTS 
85 Also that equipment call sell or release to IPKO operator. 
86 After some years this situation should be normalized and all people should move freely not just in 
territory of Kosovo but in whole Europe. This solution should be just for this period that has affected from 1999. 
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In terms of technical issues this model should work also with DSA techniques based on 
cooperative sharing with setting up PU and SU based on strategy mention above and as treated 
on appendix X. Here as we mention earlier should be a common database with a common MAC 
to avoid contention in terms of total incoming per user (MTS or IPKO). This field could be more 
related to software design than network design87.  
If the database will robust with strong software design88 having a common MAC, in 
common areas could involve more than two operators i.e. MTS, Telenor, and IPKO. How does it 
work? Same manner as previous model but here we will have Primary Users, Secondary user and 
Third Users. This point is not the purpose of this thesis as such we are not going further  
Another model that is treated her is MVNO model as a solution but is not the main object 
of this thesis. This model is presented on Appendix X. 
6.2 EXTERNAL SOLUTION 
As we have seen in the introduction or in first chapter of this thesis, the total area of Kosovo is 
10, 908 km2 . It is quite small area compared to how a BTS cover under many electromagnetic 
propagation models.  
Let’s do a simple calculation.  Total area of Kosovo is roughly 10.000km2 = 100 km x 
100km. In another hand in GSM, a BTS can reachdiameter 35km whereas in CDMA a BTS can 
reach a distance of 110 km.  This range can increase by increasing the transmition power level 
above the normal level. This can happen in state boundaries, for example in high mountains 
                                               
87 For more detain see Appendix how does Primary and Secondary Users work in Cellular Network. 
88 it is not big deal to do that 
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where few people live.Because of that, almost the entire territory of Kosovo has interference 
from neighboring states. 
 
Figure 6-3  Interference from Montenegro of GSM operators 
 
In fig 6.3 demonstrates what happens in Kosovo, and it is by no means the only one.  
In the case presented in figure above, the interference comes from Montenegro and 
occurs in area between the towns of Peja, Klina and Gjakova.  The presence of interference can 
be sensed by every user by simply searching for a network provider. Similar problems (in 
different regions) are found in the border areas with Albania, Serbia and Macedonia. 
The question is how we can solve this problem in a way that is beneficial for both parties 
(partners across the borders). Keep in mind that each party should respect territory of each other 
in terms of spectrum usage. 
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Fig.6.4 shows the Kosovo map with different zones that are needed to support spectrum 
coordination in border areas. There are two different kinds of zones: ZONE A (area between 
three states) and ZONE B (area between two states) that must be addressed. 
In this section, we will present a solution based on: Band Sharing, Areas Sharing and Per User 
Collection89. These model are presented below and are based on the models of international 
cooperation described above. 
6.2.1 Band Sharing 
Let us begin with some general definitions” Let the 900MHz GSM have two different bands: 
BAND A and BAND B. In the same manner 1800 MHz GSM has two different bands: BAND C 
and BAND D. 
In ZONE A (each area) that is indicated by a red circle, there should exist three SUB-
BANDs that belong to a full band. For example, in ZONE A, there should exist this sub bands: 
BAND A1, BAND A2 and BAND A3. So in general there are these SUB-BANDS: 
For the frequency band 900MHz: BAND A1, BAND A2 and BAND A3 
     BAND B1, BAND B2 and BAND B3 
BAND A1 = BAND A2 = BAND A3 and BAND B1 = BAND B2 = BAND B3 
For the frequency band 1800MHz: BAND C1, BAND C2 and BAND C3 
     BAND D1, BAND D2 and BAND D3 
BAND C1 = BAND C2 = BAND C3 and BAND D1 = BAND D2 = BAND D390 
                                               
89 Using Coasian Bargaining as in Internal Solution 
90 A similar solution but not the same is present on “ SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION” chapter 
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Let assume that IPKO belong BAND A of GSM 900 MHz and VALA Band B of GSM 
900MHz . Let assume that in Zone A -area 1 IPKO belong just BAND A1 and VALA belong 
BAND B1 . In the same manner we assume that let in Zone A, MTEL belongs BAND A2 and 
AMC belong BAND A3 
The radius of red circle R should be set in that manner that all parties (three states involved) 
should agree on. This radius should be set after economical and political analysis. We assume 
that this radius is 2 KM. 
In ZONE B. indicated by the green line/boundaries, there should exist two SUB-BANDs. 
So in general there are these SUB-BANDS: 
For frequency band 900MHz: BAND A1 and BAND A2 
     BAND B1 and BAND B2 
     BAND A1 = BAND A2 and BAND B1 = BAND B2 
For frequency band 1800MHz: BAND C1 and BAND C2 
     BAND D1 and BAND D2 
     BAND C1 = BAND C2 and BAND D1 = BAND D2 
The distance “D” between the green lines should be equal from the borders between the states. 
How much this distance will be depend on agreement between the states involve on areas on 
ZONE B. We assume that this distance should be 4 KM ( 2 km on each part) for the purpose of 
this analysis.  
Let assume that “Vala” (a licensed cell operator) has BAND A (at 900 MHz) and “Ipko” 
(a licensed cell operator) has BAND B and in near future Operator X will have Band C (at 
1800MHz) and Operator Y will have BAND D (at 1800MHz). 
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Now let us consider the areas in ZONE A. In these areas, the spectrum should be shared 
equally in three parts. The coverage area should be the same if possible, if not there should be a 
compensation. If, let say, “Vala” Mobile Operator has a full band of Band A, then in ZONE A it 
will have one third of a band, or A1. Likewise, in ZONE B there are two sub-bands; in this case , 
“Vala” Mobile Operator will have a half band of A or Band A1  
We can use the agreement between USA and CANADA describe briefly in anearlier 
chapter as a reference to establish the details. The same parameters that have been used there can 
adopt in Kosovo case in terms of areas and electromagnetic waves propagations including an 
antenna dimensions and power transmissions.  
 
 
Figure 6-4  Spectrum Sharing Zones between States - Protected Zones 
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Now let zoom in on the Kosovo Map and focus on fig.6.5 and 6.6. We are seeing ZONE 
A - area 1: 
Here, the states Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo meet. If we think more deeply about this 
situation, we must ask: which is the most efficient spectrum sharing for this zone? How about if 
the population density differs across the borders? In fig 6.5 is illustrated as Part 1, Part 2 and Part 
3. How about that in those parts the demand of the service differ from each other? Those three 
parties are in different states. 
 
 
Figure 6-5  Different Density of Population across the borders 
 
With this problem definition mention above we are going to the same case that previous we had 
mention above as the Internal Solution, with some minor differences. Here we should consider 
again DSA and the Coasian Bargaining procedure as in Appendix X. 
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Figure 6-6  Common Zones/Areas in terms of Territory/Band/Mobile User 
 
The similar case we have between borders: (1) Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (2) 
Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia (3) Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. 
Before we start explaining what is the best solution for this situation we should consider another 
occurrence.  
Suppose that a majority Albanian community lives in Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3(in other 
areas, this might be a majority Serbian community). Each member of this community has regular 
daily relations with, say, KOSOVO (Part 1). 
Let assume that the people that live in Part 1 has gone to Prishtina to study and they have 
permanently relocated, but they still have relatives in, say,  Part 2 or Part 3 (this is close to 
reality).Which is the most efficient sharing between Parts (1,2 and 3) in this circumstance? If 
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they pass their zone of mobile operators they will pay high as roaming user. (as we know is high 
fee). 
6.2.2 Area Sharing 
Let us assume that each Part (1,2and 3) has a BTS. Let us use the same framework as we used in 
the  Internal Solution: Let us assume that in this Zone A - area 1 as we state IPKO has a third of 
band of 900 MHz. In the same manner let assume that M:TEL91 own a third band of 900MHz 
and AMC92(the mobile operator from Albania) another third band of 900 MHz. Let us further 
assume that in these three parts (1,2 and 3), the majority of the communities are Albanians who 
have family relationships with each other. As a such the demand of IPKO service for all this 
parts is higher compared to AMC and M:TEL networks. 
We assumption here that each HLV of Part 1 - IPKO, Part 2 - M:TEL and Part 3 - AMC 
should exchange their database only from BTSs comes from the parts present in fig.9.6. This 
related to trust total incoming and as such this related to factor X that decide for agreement. 
This approach is based93 on the same principles that underlie typical 
MVNO94arrangements and as such should be supportive of an agreement between these Mobile 
operators. This agreement should include these features: 
 Users in Part 2- M:TEL and Part 3- AMC can use the Mobile Network in Part 1 -
IPKO in inside the territory of Kosovo as secondary user; in that way they can be
an MVNO User of IPKO Mobile Operator. We assume that only users that live in
91http://www.mtel.me/ 
92http://www.amc.al/ 
93 Also base on respecting the TAS agreement 
94 See Appendix X 
 98 
part 2 and part 3 can be MVNO users of IPKO. The reciprocity should work and 
this can be benefit for both parties. 
 Fee that will be charged to these users should be the same as with other MVNO 
users belong to same Mobile Operator. 
Let return to fig 6.6 again. Here we have the same situation as in fig. 6.7 and 6.9. First of all each 
part should respect the agreement achieved through bargaining. This kind of the dialog should be 
based “TAS95 or TUF96” ideas, taking business strategy into account. Each party should see 
which configuration has more revenue and which is more efficient.  
Let’s be more specific on this point: In Zone A’s areas, each part (let say Part 1,2 and 3) 
should be as equal as possible in terms97 of m2. In this zone, let say Zone A area 1, each 
operator98 should own strictly a third of band spectrum as we described above. The radius of red 
circle of Zone A should be set in accordance with three states, in this case Kosovo, Albania and 
Montenegro. We propose that radius should be no more than 2-4 km. Beyond these boundaries, 
penalties should be set if the regulatory agencies of each states find that this rule is not respected 
in practice. About the technical terms this should be set similar to USA-CANADA agreement as 
we explained in chapter 8 but it has to be adapted to size of the territory of Kosovo and the rule 
mention above. 
Up to this point, we assumed that each part (Part 1 , Part 2 and Part 3)  owned a third 
Band of the 900 MHz spectrum of BAND A i.e. IPKO has BAND A1. We assumed that the 
penalties should be set when the operator is exceeding these bands. 
                                               
95 A TAS package describes an exclusive package of spectrum rights in terms of time, space and frequency 
96Títulos de Usufructo de Frecuencias (TUF) - see Appendix C 
97 Ares that belongs to each states -best calculation is flat area. Flat area is how we take picture from 
satellite and that picture separate qually 
98 In this zone, Zone A Kosovo belong a third of each spectrum in this case a GSM spectrum. 
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In the same manner, we could imagine an alternative formulation in which we assume 
territories instead of bands. Let assume that IPKO has all BAND A in Part 1. If IPKO harms Part 
2 or interferes with any other band, penalties should be assessed to IPKO. In this case instead of 
bands, we are speaking now in terms of areas. 
In fig. 6.6 let us assume that IPKO from Part 1 harms M:TEL from Part 2 and AMC from 
Part 3 by producing interference99. Let us assume that all this Part (1,2,and 3) have majority 
Albanian populations (like in Kosovo). Here the highest demand will come toward Kosovo 
Mobile Operator (i.e IPKO). 
 
Table 6.3  Revenue of mobile operator per area -Calculation that Part 1 can harm Part 2 and Part 3 by 
increasing Tx - Power 
Power 
Transmitting in W Area Loss m2 
Revenue- 
20euro/m2 Area Loss 
Revenue- 
30euro/m2 
 of PART 1 - 
IPKO PART 2 - M:TEL PART 3 - AMC 
Parameters N Y M Z 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 500 10000 500 15000 
3 1500 30000 1500 45000 
4 2200 44000 2200 66000 
5 3500 70000 3500 105000 
6 5000 100000 5000 150000 
  Square meter Euro € 
Square 
meter Euro € 
Revenue per operator in Part 2 is 20€/month and Part 3 is 30€/month  
Revenue - mean the incomes per that area served by previous operator 
 
 
                                               
99 In reality Part 2 and Part 3 are producing interference on Part 1, but I am trying to give an example of an 
idea how this problem can be solved.  
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In table 6.3, for instance, we have all case assumed that Part 1 - IPKO  can harm Part 2-
M:TEL and Part 3-AMC. In the table we see that, Part 2 - M:TEL can earn 20€/month/m2, and 
Part 3-AMC  can earn 30€/month/m2. If Part 1-IPKO harms Part 2 -M-TEL let say, the penalties 
should be considered. If Part 1-IPKO produces interference and cover around 500 m2 of Part 2-
M:TEL100 and 1500m2 of Part 3-AMC the penalties from the authority101 should charge IPKO of 
Part 1. In this case IPKO will pay for damages that it causes to the other parts. Base on table 6.3 
this amount is €10 000 that IPKO have to pay M:TEL and another  €45 000 IPKO have to pay 
AMC from Part 3. The total penalties that IPKO has to pay to the damaged operators is €10,000 
+€45,000 = €55,000 per month.  
Base on the table and model that we proposed, we have an analogous situation to the one 
described by Forde et.al [5]. They suggest, based on Coasian Bargaining,  a beneficial way for 
operators to act. 
Let us be more specific. In the example above, IPKO102causes interference in 500m2 area 
of M:TEL103 band and around 1 500 m2 of  AMC104 band. In this example, the total area outside 
of Part 1 (that belongs to IPKO), IPKO is covering around 2 000 m2 more. For this unlicensed 
coverage IPKO will have to pay as penalties €55 000 per month. What about if IPKO is able to 
collect from this 2 000 m2, say,€65 000 /month. In this case, IPKO would be better off 
paying€55 000 to M:TEL and AMC. At the same time this also benefits AMC and MTEL.  If 
M:TEL and AMC would lease area to IPKO for a combined €55 000, then they could save even 
more because they save that amount of money goes for the maintenance and operations of the 
                                               
100 In terms of M:TEL band of 900 MHz 
101 This authority should establish altogether IPKO, MTS and MTEL. This authority sholut monitor if any 
of mobile operator is breaking down the agreement and then penalties should charge to that mobile that is braking 
down the agreement. The agreement should include this terms including penalties, TAS specification, factor X as we 
explained before and so on 
102 Part 1 
103 Part 2 
104 Part 3 
 101 
BTSs of area of Part 2 and area of Part 3. This bargain procedure should happen between mobile 
operator involved on this areas Part (1,2 and 3) through supply/demand  or bid/demand model. 
AMC and MTEL could even lease to IPKO its own BTSs. 
Let us find a general formula for this solution. Let the area loss of Part 2 – MTEL - be 
noted as “N” and its Revenue as “Y”. In the same manner let the area loss of Part 3 be noted as 
“M” and revenue its revenue as “Z”. So IPKO can benefit by causing harm and paying penalties 
toward M:TEL and AMC for any value,  say ”W” that satisfies the equation ࢃ > ܻ + ܼ toward 
the area that IPKO harms. The value W is the income that IPKO will collect by harming the area 
that belongs to Part 2 (€Y revenues)  and Part 3 (€Z revenues)105. 
 
6.2.3 Per User Collection 
Another solution that we are going to give here is based on the Internal Solution, i.e., the number 
of users that each mobile operator of each Part (1,2 and 3)Has. 
Let consider again Zone A- area 1 and follow the same process as above for the other 
Zones. As before, we assume that the majority of the population in this zone is from the 
Albanian community.  
This model is based on users and is building on revenues that that mobile operators can collect 
from users. In contrast, the previous modelswere based on spectrum and territory, respectively. 
In practice, most users in the Balkan106countries hold (at least) two SIM cards, which is 
the assumption we are taking here also.  Based on this, we can compute the table below. 
                                               
105 0<N<5 000, 0<M< 5 000, 0<Y<100 000, 0<Z<150 000 
106http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkans 
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Table 6.4  Total incoming from user based on nationality 
Number of user 
base on 
nationality 
Part 1 - Mobile 
Network: IPKO 
Part 2 - Mobile 
Network : M:TEL 
Part 3 - Mobile 
Network : AMC 
///////// Users  Money 
Collected 
Users  Money 
Collected 
Users  Money 
Collected 
Total107 Totalx1.2108 
Albanians109 3 000 21 000 1500 9 000 2500 12 500 42 500 45 550 
Serbs 0 0 50 300 10 50 
Montenegro’s 0 0 30 180 5 25 
Bosnians 200 1 400 30 180 25 125 
Romanians 5 35 0 0 20 100 
Total110  22 435  9660  12 800 
Total - kos111    10 800112  13 750 
Amount of 
money that users 
spent per 
month113 
7 euro/month 6 euro/moth 5 euro/moth 
 
Based these assumptions, we can see that the Albanian community will spent  more 
money  per month for mobile communication. In this way, IPKO(Kosovo mobile operator) will 
collect more money per user compare to other mobile operators (M:TEL and AMC). Most of 
these expenditures in this area are for connections to Kosovo users, even from Albania. In this 
case, a user from Part 2114(M:TEL)calling a  user from Part1 (IPKO)does so at a higher  
international rate. If users that live in Part 2 (MTEL) and Part 3 (AMC) will have lower pricesto 
call Part 1  (IPKO-users), these users that are majority Albanians community will spend more 
money /month. We assume that this increase factor should multiply by factor  be 1.2 or 
                                               
107 Total money spend by user base on nationality 
108 21 000  + 9000*1.2 + 12 500 *1.1 = 21 000 + 10 800 + 13 750 = 45 550. Factor 1.2 from Montenegro 
compare from factor 1.1 from Albania tell us that, people living in Montenegro has more probably to live in Kosovo 
than people comes from Albania. 
109 All Albanians that live in Montenegro, and even many in Albania, have more relationships with people 
in Kosovo than to people in Albania and Montenegro 
110 Total amount of money that Mobile operator can collect in its own area-zone i.e M:TEL from Part 2. 
111Total amount supposing that IPKO will collect from this user that becomes IPKO users. Factor 1.2 will 
follow user from part 2 and factor 1.1 will follow user from Part 3. 
112 9000*1.2=10800, this serve just to Albanian community where IPKO has interes. 
113 These amounts of money that users spend per month are taken from internal analysis of TRA - Kosovo. 
114 From Montenegro 
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1.1115.What does this mean? Having a normal price per call inside same mobile operator instead 
of international call (roaming call that is known for high rate of price/call), users will spend more 
credits/money per month and that with increasing factor we assume at least will be multiplying 
factor 1.1 or 1.2. So if I spend €5/month, living in Montenegro and most of friends I have in 
Kosovo in this way calling from MTS to IPKO and instead of that If I have same operator, much 
more cheaper price/call I will have so this means that as I assume, I will spend €5(1.1)/month = 
€5.5/month. In this way I will call from IPKO to IPKO 
Let’s do some simple calculation here: We assumed factor 1.2or 1.1, this mean that user 
of Part 2 and Part 3 will spend more116 if the same user have price per call roughly as same users 
as in inside Part 1.  Here I am seeing two scenarios: 
First Scenario: IPKO benefits if it harms Part 2 and Part 3 operators and pays penalties 
to MTEL(Part2) of €9,660 per month and to AMC (Part3) of€12,800  per month. IPKO has 
calculated that it will collect from Part 2, €9000*1.2 = €10,800/month and from Part 3 
€12,500*1.1= €13 750/month. Now let do another calculation here in terms of how much money 
IPKO can earn from an agreement with M:TEL and AMC: 
 
From M:TEL: 
€10800 - €9660 = €1140/month 
From AMC: 
€13750 - €12800 = €950/month 
Let us define α= €1140/month and ߚ= €950/month. 
 
                                               
115 (Base on Table 9.2). If Albanian users spends 9 000 per month in Montengro - Part2 from M:TEL 
mobile operator then 9000x1.2=10800 
116 Just Albanians community 
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If ࢻ > 0	ܽ݊݀/݋ݎ	ߚ > 0then the Part 1 carrier can bargaining, over the size of the 
penalty,  harm Part 2 and Part 3 and pay the penalties and still profit.  At  the same time, MTEL 
and AMC could reduce their operations,  saving money from maintenance of their BTS in Part 2 
and Part 3 and still earn the penaly. 
As Coase has explained in this paper[2], IPKO would benefit in terms of social costeven 
for low values of α and β (even α = 0 and β=0) . This mean that IPKO user will benefit having a 
cheaper communication with their relatives and will improve the public image of IPKO as 
nurturing the Albanian community117. 
At further distances from the border region, this strategy should be discouraged through 
higher penalties. The harming region should be just Part 1, 2 and 3. Out of this region should be 
cleared in terms of interference(harming). This is what we suggest for this stage118. 
Remember that in Part 2 and Part 3 harms should be allowed by MTEL and AMC. If a 
bargain can’t be reached the harm should be stopped. Also remember that, in reality, the 
Montenegro operator (M:TEL) is interfering around 10 000 m2of Kosovo territory and does not 
currently pay penalties to any of Kosovo’s mobile operator of Kosovo or TRA. If MTEL creates 
interference in such a large area and has few users in that area the penalties so it doesn’t benefit 
them to interfere. Without an agreement, the interference that comes from Montenegro and the 
other states will continue unabated. 
Based on analysis that we have done above the operator should set up the agreement 
between them (IPKO, M:TEL and AMC). The main incentive should be the revenue that they 
will have on this agreement. Each operator should select such agreement that benefits more for 
                                               
117 Same can happen to north of Kosovo to Serbian Community 
118 Out of the regions Part 1, Part 2 and Part 3 each mobile operators should respect the agreement between 
borders sharing as explained in SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 
chapter. 
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them. These benefits come from th point that how they agree to share users, area of spectrum 
that’s benefit more for them. This analysis is done to see that they will collect more money with 
agreement base on analysis above than without agreement. Also the penalties should be part of 
agreement but it can’t be the main incentive as the revenue is. Persuade of bargain procedures in 
another challenge point that is based on respect on agreements and it is related to practible 
procedures that is not scope of this thesis. 
I believe that this kind of agreement should work because has strong incentive like 
revenue with this agreement. All partners will benefit. Also if they decide to don’t respect this 
kind of agreement after they set-up, they will not have any benefit not just in terms of revenue 
but also in terms of international cooperation. They will show how they are serious to make 
business on international scope. There are some duties that neighbor state should respect.119 
Or, at simplest way, without any analysis, without any business view, without any 
cooperation, each part respect TAS or TUF conditions and Fixed Spectrum Allocation for their 
regions. Respect ZONE A and ZONE B, respect radius of circle and final respect third band of 
ZONE A or half band of ZONE B. 
In fig 9.7 we have the same case like previous but here are just two parts. The condition 
should similar as previous example with three parts on Zone A. 
 
                                               
119 This challenge should be seen after the agreement will set up but the probability to don’t work this 
agreement is too low. Normally this agreement should have another third part as a guarantee. 
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Figure 6-7  Protected Zone- with different density of population 
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
The Kosovo is the youngest state in the world. It has declared independence from Serbia 
in 17 February 2008, though Serbia does not recognize this. . As a result, the 
Telecommunication Market in Kosovo faces some unique challenges. In particular, 
disputed mobile service providers are operating in some Serbs enclaves, creating 
challenges for the Government of Kosovo to manage the spectrum. Based on our data, 
tens of millions of Euros per year are being lost by the stakeholders (the Government of 
Kosovo, licensed and unlicensed mobile operators). Beyond this, the social cost is that 
some people who live in enclaves do not always have the services of a mobile operator. 
 We reviewed the analyses done by the regulatory agencies in Kosovo and Serbia. 
We have also reviewed the telecommunication laws and their policy strategies for these 
two governments. This analysis has shown that a legal foundation for the resolution of 
this problem seems to exist. 
 Regarding external interference, we reviewed the cooperation in several example 
countries.  Based on these research and theory there are clearly technical solutions to this 
problem that have succeeded elsewhere that could be adopted by the parties surrounding 
Kosovo. 
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People living in Kosovo have become increasingly frustrated with this problem. 
Policymakers have not offered a solution to this problem, and the indirect costs (damage 
of unlicensed mobile operators and interference in Kosovo) is growing. 
 This thesis has offered a solution to this problem that will benefit every 
stakeholder. We have also shown that every participant has a strong incentive to 
participate in this agreement because of the private and social benefits. Our solution is 
based on Coase Barganing theory. We believe that our solution will work in practice but 
could benefit from a third party guarantee120.  
We have argued that this solution has numerous positive externalities, such as the 
reduction of social cost, economic efficiency, and integration of all communities in 
Kosovo.  
Social cost: All users who live in Zone A, Zone B and the Red Zone should have lower 
communications cost compared to the current situation. Economic efficiency: Some 
internal operator considered unlicensed before agreement, they will operate by having a 
good revenue with no interruptions anymore by Telecommunication Regulatory 
Authority. Their users will have lower costs per call-minute. Other operators, licensed 
operator considered before agreement will have more revenue inside the Red Area 
because they will have no interference from unlicensed operator consider before 
agreement. Also, the Government will see a revenue increase from the tax on the profit 
from the Mobile Operators121. 
Political view: It will be a positive outcome if a significant and visible problem is solved. 
It could help improve the relations between the ethnic Albanians Serbs who live in 
                                               
120 Could be international comunity 
121 From License Mobile Operator, Red Zones Operator and from Zone A and Zone B  
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Kosovo as well as in Serbia. The future of these to states lies in the European Union,  and 
there is no reason to have this kind of problem. 
Integration: This is based on the concept that every person should feel him/her self equal 
with others. By extension, all people should treated equally by every kind of service that 
is available.   
As we have seen through this thesis our solution base on analysis and data that we have 
collected is focused on an economically sound solution for efficient spectrum management. This 
is not a political solution but it can be a good place to start negotiation for achieving apolitically 
feasible solution in this region for this problem. We have mentioned also the benefits that will 
achieve with this solution in political terms although this was not the topic of this thesis. 
Another point that I would like to make here regards the mobile network technology. The 
operators in Kosovo have currently deployed2.5G GSM mobile networks.. We therefore focused 
on an economical solution based on this technical platform.. Second generation has GPRS for 
data that in practice offers data rates around 40kbps. It can be used this channel for set up DSA 
platform. This service should be enough for DSA solution or if this doesn’t work , band of GPRS 
wouldn’t be enough, then  we will set up FIX spectrum allocation- FSA. We have thought to use 
GPRS band of 2.5G for our solution. These need to upgrade a special (based on our demand) 
software application for GSM network. While this is  not the main focus of thesis, we mention it 
just as an idea how it should be implemented and leave it for future work. 
If this solution will work on 2.5G - GSM, in 3G and 4G this will be much easier. For 
instance in 3G there is HSPA up to 168Mbps downlink and 22Mbps uplink. This will be more 
than enough to use this band for setting up any DSA platform solution. 
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About 4G/LTE generation, there is some application that supports DSA or something like that. 
Basically LTE is DSA network. LTE use spectrum with high level of efficiency. 
We are not focused how our solution will work in detail because first should achieve the 
agreement then we will begin to implement it in terms of technical issues including software 
application that will need to achieve DSA technique or Cooperative and Non-Cooperative 
Sharing. 
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8.0  APPENDIX A - KOSOVO 
8.1 KOSOVO OVERVIEW 
Kosovo (Albanian: Kosovë, Kosova; Serbian: Косово, Kosovo ) is a disputed territory following 
the collapse of Yugoslavia. The partially recognized Republic of Kosovo (Albanian: Republika e 
Kosovës; Serbian: Република Косово, Republika Kosovo), a self-declared independent state, 
has de facto control over most of the territory, with North Kosovo being the largest Kosovo Serb 
enclave.  Serbia does not recognize the unilateral secession of Kosovo and considers it a United 
Nations-governed entity within its sovereign territory, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 
Metohija (Serbian: Аутономна Покрајина Косово и Метохија, Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo i 
Metohija), according to the 2006 Constitution of Serbia. 
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8.1.1  Background 
Kosovo is landlocked and borders Serbia north and eastward, the Republic of Macedonia to the 
south, Albania to the west and Montenegro to the northwest (the latter three recognise it as 
independent). The largest city and the capital of Kosovo is Prishtina (alternatively spelled 
Pristina or Priština), while other cities include Peja , Prizren, Gjakova, and Mitrovica 
During classical antiquity, the territory roughly corresponding to present-day Kosovo was 
part of several tribal alliances, including that formed by the Dardani. Upon conquest, the Romans 
dissolved existing tribal alliances and re-integrated communities centered on Roman civitates122 
as part of the Roman province of Moesia Superior. Subdivisions in Late Roman times created the 
region of "Dardania". After the collapse of Roman control, the region was contested between 
Avars123 , Sklavenes and Byzantines, and later between the Byzantines, Bulgarians and Serbs. 
Dardania is one of the tribes of Illyria, predecessor of Albanian. 
In June 1878, the breathtaking city of Prizren saw the establishment of the League of Prizren, an 
Albanian cultural and political movement for autonomy and eventual independence from 
Ottoman rule. Whereas Albania declared independence in 1912, Kosovo – which had briefly 
liberated itself from the crumbling Ottoman rule – was invaded that same year by Serbia, whose 
long decades of rule were resisted by the overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo. 
The people of Kosovo were used to active resistance – they had done the same against Roman 
and Ottoman rule after all Kosovo was the last of the seven nations to emerge out of Yugoslavia 
                                               
122In the history of the Roman Empire, the Latin term civitas (plural civitates) referred to the condition of 
Roman citizenship 
123http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Avars, 
http://www.hyperhistory.com/online_n2/civil_n2/histscript4_n2/avars.html 
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in the wake of Serbia’s four bloody wars of aggression against fellow federal entities – Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – in the 1990s. 
After the Kosovo War and the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the territory came 
under the interim administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), most of 
whose roles were assumed by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in 
December 2008. In February 2008 individual members of the Assembly of Kosovo (acting in 
personal capacity and not binding the Assembly itself) declared Kosovo's independence as the 
Republic of Kosovo. Its independence is recognized by 75 UN member states and the Republic 
of China (Taiwan). On 8 October 2008, upon request of Serbia, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the issue 
of Kosovo's declaration of independence. On 22 July 2010, the ICJ ruled that Kosovo's 
declaration of independence did not violate international law, which its president said contains 
no "prohibitions on declarations of independence". 
The region currently known as "Kosovo" became an administrative region in 1946, as the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. In 1974, the compositional "Kosovo and 
Metohija" was reduced to simple "Kosovo" in the name of the Socialist Autonomous Province of 
Kosovo in Yugosllavia, but in 1990 was renamed back to Autonomous Province of Kosovo and 
Metohija 
The entire region is commonly referred to in English simply as Kosovo and in Albanian 
as Kosova  or Kosovë ("indefinite" form, [kɔˈsɔːv]). In Serbian, a distinction is made between 
the eastern and western areas; the term Kosovo (Косово) is used for the eastern part, while the 
western part is called Metohija. In Albanian western part mean ’’Rafshi i Dukagjinit’’ - Plain of 
Dukagjini. But whole territory know as KOSOVA. 
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8.1.2 Kosovo War 
 
In 1995 the Dayton Agreement ended the Bosnian War, drawing considerable international 
attention. However, despite the hopes of Kosovar Albanians, the situation in Kosovo remained 
largely unaddressed by the international community, and by 1996 the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), an ethnic Albanian guerilla group, had prevailed over the non-violent resistance 
movement and had started offering armed resistance to Serbian and Yugoslav security forces, 
resulting in early stages of the Kosovo War. 
By 1998, as the violence had worsened and displaced scores of Albanians, Western 
interest had increased. The Serbian authorities were compelled to sign a ceasefire and partial 
retreat, monitored by OSCE observers according to an agreement negotiated by Richard 
Holbrooke. However, the ceasefire did not hold and fighting resumed in December 1998. The 
Račak massacre in January 1999 in particular brought new international attention to the conflict. 
Within weeks, a multilateral international conference was convened and by March had prepared 
a draft agreement known as the Rambouillet Accords, calling for restoration of Kosovo's 
autonomy and deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces. The Serbian party found the terms 
unacceptable and refused to sign the draft. 
Between March 24 and June 10, 1999, NATO intervened by bombing Yugoslavia aimed 
to force Milošević to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. This military action was not authorized 
by the Security Council of the United Nations and was therefore contrary to the provisions of the 
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United Nations Charter. Combined with continued skirmishes between Albanian guerrillas and 
Yugoslav forces the conflict resulted in a further massive displacement of population in Kosovo. 
UN administration period 
On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 
1244, which placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized 
KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force. Resolution 1244 provided that Kosovo would have 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and affirmed the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia, which has been legally succeeded by the Republic of Serbia. 
Some around 200,000, representing the majority of the Serb population, left when the Serbian 
forces left. Many displaced Serbs are afraid to return to their homes, even with UNMIK 
protection, specially the people who was involved in crimes in Kosovo. Around 120,000-150,000 
Serbs remain(most of them return) in Kosovo, but are subject to ongoing harassment due to fear 
for their safety. 
In February 2007, Ahtisaari delivered a draft status settlement proposal to leaders in 
Belgrade and Pristina, the basis for a draft UN Security Council Resolution which proposes 
'supervised independence' for the province. A draft resolution, backed by the United States, the 
United Kingdom and other European members of the Security Council, was presented and 
rewritten four times to try to accommodate Russian concerns that such a resolution would 
undermine the principle of state sovereignty. 
 
8.1.3 Declaration of Independence 
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Republic of Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008 and over the following days, a 
number of states(the United States, Turkey, Albania, Austria, Croatia, Germany, Italy, France, 
the United Kingdom, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Australia, Poland and others) announced 
their recognition, despite protests by Russia and others in the UN. Currently, 75 UN states 
recognize the independence of Kosovo and it has become a member country of the IMF and 
World Bank as the Republic of Kosovo. 
The UN Security Council remains divided on the question (as of 4 July 2008)124 . Of the 
five members with veto power, USA, UK, and France recognized the declaration of 
independence, and the People's Republic of China has expressed concern, while Russia considers 
it unlicensed. As of May 2010, no member-country of CIS, CSTO or SCO has recognized 
Kosovo as independent. Kosovo has not made a formal application for UN membership yet in 
view of a possible veto from Russia and China. 
On 8 October 2008, the UN General Assembly resolved to request the International Court 
of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence 
from Serbia. The advisory opinion, which is legally non-binding but had been expected to carry 
"moral" weight, was rendered on 22 July 2010, holding that Kosovo's declaration of 
independence was not in violation of international law. 
As of 9 October 2008, all of Kosovo's immediate neighbor states except Serbia have 
recognized the declaration of independence. Montenegro and Macedonia announced their 
recognition of Kosovo on 9 October 2008. Albania,  Croatia,  Bulgaria  and  Hungary have also 
recognized the independence of Kosovo. 
 
                                               
124This remain same even now on 2011 
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8.1.4 Geography 
 
Kosovo represents an important link between central and southern Europe and the Adriatic and 
Black Seas. Kosovo has an area of 10,908 square km. It lies between latitudes 41° and 44° N, 
and longitudes 20° and 22° E.  
The largest cities are Pristina, the capital, with an estimated 500,000 inhabitants. The old 
city of Prizren is towards the south west, with a population of 110,000. Peja/Peć in the west has 
70,000 inhabitants with Mitrovica/Kosovska Mitrovica in the north at around 70,000. 
North or Northern Kosovo is a region in the northern part of Kosovo with an ethnic Serb 
majority that functions largely autonomously from the remainder of Kosovo. Ibër/Ibarian 
Kolashin, a toponym that pre-dates the political partition, is also used to refer to the area. North 
Kosovo is by far the largest of the Serb-dominated areas within Kosovo, and unlike the others, 
directly borders Central Serbia. This has facilitated its ability to govern itself almost completely 
independently of the Kosovo institutions in a de facto state of partition. Although the Kosovo 
status process had repeatedly ruled out formalizing this partition as a permanent solution, it has 
been increasingly mooted amidst continued deadlock. 
 
8.1.5 Demographic 
 
According to the Kosovo in 2005 Survey of the Statistical Office of Kosovo, Kosovo's total 
population is estimated between 1.9 and 2.2 million with the following ethnic composition:  
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Albanians 92%,  Serbs 4%, Bosniaks  and Gorans 2%,  Turks 1%, Roma 1%. CIA World 
Factbook estimates the following ratio: 88% Albanians, 8% Kosovo Serbs and 4% other ethnic 
groups. According to latest CIA The World Factbook estimated data, as of July 2009, Kosovo's 
population stands at 1,804,838 persons. It stated that ethnic composition is "Albanians 88%, 
Serbs 7%, other 5% (Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turk, Ashkali, Egyptian, Janjevci - Croats) (2011 - 
GOK is doing registering of population and their economy) 
 
8.1.6 Relations between Albanian and Serb communities 
 
The relations between Kosovo's ethnic Albanian and Serb populations have been hostile since 
the rise of nationalism in the Balkans during the 19th century, rivalry which became strong after 
Serbia gained Kosovo from the Ottoman Empire in 1912 and after Albania became independent 
in the same year. During the Ottoman period however, Serbs and Albanians within Kosovo 
enjoyed good-neighbourly relations, working together to oppose foreign meddling in the territory 
on many occasions. During the Tito-era of communist rule in Yugoslavia, the ethnic Albanian 
and Serb populations of Kosovo were strongly irreconcilable with sociological studies during the 
Tito-era indicating that ethnic Albanian and Serb peoples in Kosovo rarely accepted each other 
as neighbors or friends and few held interethnic marriages. Ethnic prejudices, stereotypes and 
mutual distrust between ethnic Albanians and Serbs have remained common for decades. The 
level of intolerance and separation between the ethnic Albanian and Serb communities during the 
Tito-period was reported by sociologists to be worse than that of Croat and Serb communities in 
Yugoslavia which also had tensions but held some closer relations between each other. 
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8.1.7 Kosovo Serbs Enclaves 
Kosovo Serb Enclaves are the areas of Kosovo where Serbs form a majority, except for North 
Kosovo. While North Kosovo is connected to the rest of Serbia and mostly functions as a part of 
it, the enclaves are surrounded with areas of Albanian majority. Those enclave tend to be part of 
Serbia, they doesn’t accept Kosovo Law, more than that they don’t recognize Independence of 
Kosovo. In most of the enclaves, the freedom of movement for Serbs is limited only to the area 
of the particular enclave but passing the time they have start to move freely over all territory of 
Kosova. 
 
Figure 8-1 Kosovo Ethnic Group Poulation 
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8.1.8 Mitrovica 
Mitrovica /Kosovska Mitrovica (Albanian; Mitrovicë or Mitrovica, Serbian: Косовска 
Митровица or Kosovska Mitrovica; Turkish: Mitroviça), is a city and municipality in northern 
Kosovo. It is the administrative centre of the homonymous district. 
Since the end of the Kosovo War of 1999 it has been divided between an ethnic-
Albanian-majority south and an ethnic-Serb-majority north (the whole city, however, has an 
Albanian majority). Its northern part is the de facto capital of the Serb enclave of North 
Kosovo.the aftermath of the war, the town became a symbol of Kosovo's ethnic divisions 
Mitrovica became the focus for ethnic clashes between the two communities, exacerbated by the 
presence of nationalist extremists on north sides. The bridges linking the two sides of the town 
were guarded by armed groups determined to prevent incursions by the other side. Because of 
the tense situation in the town, KFOR troops and the UNMIK police were stationed there in large 
numbers to head off trouble. However, violence and harassment was often directed against 
members of the "wrong" ethnic community on both sides of the river, necessitating the presence 
of troops and police checkpoints around individual areas of the city and even in front of 
individual buildings. 
On March 17, 2004, the drowning of an Albanian child in the river prompted major 
ethnic violence in the town and a Serbian teenager was killed. Demonstrations by thousands of 
angry Albanians and Serbs mobilized to stop them crossing the river degenerated into rioting and 
gunfire, leaving at eight Albanians dead and at least 300 injured. The bloodshed sparked off the 
worst unrest in Kosovo seen since the end of the 1999 war. 
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8.2 CHRONOLOGY OF MOBILE AND TELECOMMUNICATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND LEGISLATURE PROBLEM IN KOSOVO - JOURNALIST 
AND PROFESSIONAL VIEW AFTER 1999 TILL NOWADAYS 
 
8.2.1 Kosovo: PTK threatens unlicensed mobile operators with court [55] 
29.05.2006, 10:08 
 
Prishtinë, May 29, 2006 - The Post and Telecom of Kosovo (PTK) together with Monaco 
Telecom and Cable and Wireless, has sent a letter last week to all unlicensed mobile telephony 
operators in Kosovo asking them to halt their transmission, or they will face the court. A copy of 
this letter was sent to UNMIK Chief Jessen-Petersen, the Government of Kosovo and the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA). 
“The PTK has verified that you are operating unlicensedly in Kosovo, where the only 
licensed operator is the PTK,” the letter reads. “We have made surveys and we know precisely 
how you have increased the antenna transmission power in order to transmit waves within the 
territory of Kosovo.” 
The PTK has verified that these unlicensed operators have a higher signal power than 
allowed by European regulations for transmission. "The PTK has requested them to halt their 
unlicensed operations or they will face legal procedures and the PTK shall request compensation 
for the losses caused to the PTK,” said the source. 
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There are six unlicensed operators in Kosovo: Mobtel and Telekom Serbia, Mobimak and 
Kosmofon from Macedonia, Promonte from Montenegro and the AMC from Albania. 
 
8.2.2 Kosovo regulator to switch off unlicensed mobile networks [56] 
Friday 20 October 2006 
 
All unlicensed mobile phone operators in Kosovo, other than Telenor in Serbian regions, 
will be turned off, said telecommunications regulatory chairman Anton Berisha to daily 
newspaper Lajm. He explained that the body, the KTA, had received an announcement from 
UNMIK that the agency has the right to block all unlicensed mobile communication operators' 
equipment in the region. Nevertheless, he said, Telenor's equipment in Serbian communities 
cannot be touched. The agency has prepared a plan of action and has contacted municipal 
governments and relevant ministries, and will begin a united action to shut down off all of the 
unlicensed operators in the region. According to the KTA's estimates, the unlicensed work of 
mobile telephone companies has cost the Kosovo budget at least EUR 100 million since 1999. 
Along with Telenor, the Mobilna Telefonija Srbije network is also available in the region. 
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8.2.3 Unlicensed operators continue to cause damage to Vala [54] 
23.2.2007 
 
More than 40 percent of the frequency range of Vala, the only legal mobile operator in 
Kosovo, is used by Mobile Telephony of Serbia (MTS). According to the Post and Telekom of 
Kosovo (PTK) experts, at this moment MTS is using 37 channels.  
The PTK officials say the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) is not 
stopping the MTS unlicensed operators on the territory of Kosovo, and that in fact MTS is 
slowly expanding its network in Mitrovica, Pristina, Prizren and Pec. 
“This proves that TRA's activities on removing the unlicensed operators' antennas were 
only a media show, and not a real initiative”, said Aferdita Qurkagjiu from PTK.  
 
8.2.4 Vala And iPKO Want Action On Foreign Operators [53] 
Serbia - Mobile - Feb 26 2009 
 
 Kosovo's incumbent fixed-line operator PTK and owner of mobile operator Vala, has 
criticised the Telecommunications Regulatory Agency (TRA) for failing to eliminate 'unlicensed' 
mobile operators in Kosovo. PTK alleges Serbia's MTS, Albania's AMC, Montenegro's 
Promonte and Macedonia's Mobimak (T-Mobile Macedonia) and Cosmofon are among the 
perpetrators. 
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PTK has said it has experienced technical problems due to the interference of unlicensed 
mobile operators and that until the problem is sorted there 'can be no appropriate liberalisation of 
the telecommunications market, fair competition and service quality.' According to 
BalkanInsight the unlicensed operators have an estimated 150,000 customers, which would 
account for almost 10% of Kosovo's mobile subscriber base. The online news source also states 
that Akan Ismajli, the general director of iPKO (Kosovo's second mobile operator) has dismissed 
the TRA's claims there is no legal recourse to eliminate the bogus operators. 
PTK has invited the TRA and the government to take steps to eradicate the unlicensed 
operators which it claims have increased their network coverage from year to year. Ismajli says 
their antennas and base stations are not concealed but clearly visible and that, given the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, there is no reason that PTK and iPKO should be 
hampered by unlicensed operators.BalkanInsight also reports that Ismajli said the two operators' 
estimated losses were EUR170mn (US$217mn) per year and that, as well as affecting their 
profits, there was a significant cost to Kosovo's budget. 
The operators will be hoping their accusations create waves within Kosovo's government 
and regulator. They have intimated that the continued presence of unlicensed operators is an 
attack on Kosovo's sovereignty in a region where political tensions have remained since the war. 
The suggestion that Kosovo's budget is losing out to operators from foreign countries will be 
weightier in today's uncertain economic climate and could spur the government into action. 
There was also a possible implicit accusation that the 150,000 customers who are subscribed to 
the unlicensed operators should be more patriotic. Finally, there was a warning to the regulator 
that its attempts to liberalise the mobile market further will be impeded if the unlicensed 
operators issue is not resolved. 
125 
The legality of the other operators is further complicated by Serbia not recognising the 
secession of Kosovo. Nevertheless, as long as the foreign operators are providing services in 
Kosovo, PTK and iPKO will see their profits dented and be less incentivised to aid the 
liberalisation and development of Kosovo's mobile market. 
8.2.5 Kosovo cuts off Serbian mobile phone providers, Belgrade protests [58] 
Apr 23, 2010 
Pristina, Kosovo/Belgrade - Kosovan authorities said Friday that they have shut down 
unlicensed Serbian mobile phone installations in their country. 
The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority said in a statement that it 'has taken 
action preventing unauthorized unlicensed activity of non-licensed operators, who have extended 
their network within the territory of Kosovo.' 
Serbian mobile phone operators had continued extending their services in northern and 
central Kosovo via installations set up before the 1999 war, which ended with NATO ousting 
Serbian security forces from the country to stop ethnic bloodshed. 
The mainly Albanian Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008. 
The shutdown affected users of Serbian mobile providers in central Kosovo, Belgrade 
media reported. 
The Serbian government condemned the measure as a 'new attempt at isolating Serbs' 
who remain in Kosovo. 
Though the United States and the majority of European Union nations recognize Kosovo, 
Belgrade continues refusing to even acknowledge it. Serbia insists that Kosovo is its territory and 
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has made it a policy not to communicate with Pristina over any issue. 
Serbia also encourages Serbs in their enclaves, especially in the northern part of Kosovo, to resist 
the central Pristina authorities. 
 
8.2.6 Kosovo disables Serb cell phone towers before sale [55] 
Mon Apr 26, 2010 
 
PRISTINA, April 26 (Reuters) - In a bid to make its state-owned telecoms company more 
attractive for privatization, Kosovo has removed most unlicensed cell phone transmitters owned 
by operators from neighboring Serbia, officials said on Monday. 
Kosovo officials say they were losing around 200,000 potential consumers because of 
Serbian providers operating transmitters in Serb enclaves in Kosovo. 
"We have cut off 26 stations and only two remain to be removed later," said Ekrem 
Hoxha, head of Telecommunication Regulatory Authority. "The signal is either eliminated or it 
is too weak." 
The three-day action against unlicensed cell phone towers comes ahead of Kosovo's plans 
to privatise its national post and telecoms company (PTK) by August or September. 
The crackdown prompted protests from the 120,000-strong ethnic Serb community and 
the government in Belgrade which is opposed to Kosovo's independence. 
Serbia's President Boris Tadic described the move as "violations of human rights" and 
said he will seek to restore the connections. "The Serbian population is ... in jeopardy, they have 
no communications, no telephones, they cannot call for help," he said. 
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Kosovo's state-owned telecoms company said it is distributing free SIM cards for 
consumers left without service. 
About 2,000 Kosovo Serbs rallied against the move in the Gracanica enclave just outside 
capital Pristina on Monday. 
Hoxha said authorities will launch similar actions if they detect new signals from 
unlicensed operators. 
Kosovo, a country of two million, has no country code as it is not a member of the United 
Nations and its International Telecommunications Union (ITU). International calls currently go 
through Monaco, Serbia and Slovenia. 
Kosovo is recognised by 66 countries, including the United States and most EU member 
states, but not by Serbia, nor its ally Russia. 
So far, the government in Pristina has issued two mobile licences, one to state telecom 
and the other to Telekom Slovenije (TLSG.LJ). The government is currently considering whether 
to invite bidders for another license. 
Both Kosovo cell phone operators have said that some of their transmitters were damaged 
in explosions over the past three days in predominantly ethnic Serb northern areas where the 
Pristina government has no authority. 
"This is a positive signal for investors who would want to buy telecoms, but Kosovo has 
to show that these (Serbian) operators will not start working again," said Safet Gerxhaliu, an 
economist for the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce 
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8.2.7 Serbs protest against Kosovo communication blackout [51] 
April 27, 2010 
 
In estimated 3,000 Serbs, angered that their mobile phones had gone dead, protested on 
Monday in the Serb enclave of Gracanica, outside of Pristina, against the actions of Kosovo 
officials to disable mobile phone networks from Serbia, reported the Serbian news agency 
Tanjug. 
Over the weekend, the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory Authority reportedly 
removed or damaged more than 20 repeater stations owned by two Belgrade-based mobile 
operators Telekom Srbija and Telenor. In an official statement, the authorities said it had taken 
action against "unauthorized unlicensed activity of non- licensed operators, who have extended 
their network within the territory of Kosovo." 
Symbolically, the protest was led by ambulances, to underscore the fact that emergency 
services to the 100,000 Serbs south of the Ibar River, which divides the Serb-dominated north of 
Kosovo from the ethnic Albanian majority, have been left without communication. 
Protesters said the actions were tantamount to blackmailing them to integrate into a state 
they do not recognize. Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and Serbia is challenging the 
legality of this act before the International Court of Justice. 
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8.2.8 Kosovo Serbs Protest over Cut Phone Lines [57] 
27 APR 2010 
 
Some 3,000 Kosovo Serbs staged a protest in the Serb enclave of Gracanica on Monday, 
after base stations of Serbian telecommunications operators were disabled in central Kosovo. 
Meanwhile, Kosovo’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority has said that its operation to 
remove Serbian-licensed masts has ended. 
The Kosovo Serb protesters yesterday called on the international community to react and 
stop the Kosovo government from prohibiting them from using the phone services of Serbian 
mobile operators. 
With banners saying: "Blind, Mute, Deaf" and "No Network, Why?" the protestors, who 
started gathering at noon with a rally on the main street in Gracanica, have announced that 
similar gatherings are expected to be held every day until the Serbian mobile phone services are 
re-activated. 
Ahead of the crowd of protesters were ambulances apparently intended to symbolise that 
communication with such emergency services cannot exist without properly functioning phones. 
More than 20 base stations of Serbian telecommunications operators in central Kosovo 
were disabled by workers of Kosovo's Telecommunications Regulatory Body and special units 
of the Kosovo police on Friday and Saturday in a move that angered Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs. 
In a statement, Kosovo’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, TRA, revealed that 
it had disabled 26 mobile masts in 22 locations across Kosovo. 
The publicly owned Post Telecom of Kosovo has said that it has supplied more than 
2,500 sim cards for its Vala mobile phone operator to Serb enclaves for free and is working with 
130 
Monaco Telecom, which provides the network, to offer affordable prices between Vala and 
Serbian numbers. 
Vala said that as a result of this, traffic on the network has risen by 4.5 per cent compared 
to the last weekend. 
“We have noticed that there is great interest among the young residents of the Serb 
community to be supplied with Vala sim cards, which makes us feel good and encourages us to 
further enhance our services, especially during an emergency situation like this,” said Shyqyri 
Haxha, CEO of the PTK. 
He added that fixed phone lines and the Internet have also been disrupted in Serb 
enclaves as in some areas these had been provided through the masts and not lines. 
“Since the antennas of unlicensed operators have been removed and disconnected from 
the system, there was an emergency need to connect these customers to a different system, 
namely in our system, in order to provide fixed telephony services and internet, therefore, we 
have done it successfully,” said Haxha. 
PTK said that in Serb-majority Strpce, in southern Kosovo, an optical cable was damaged 
on Saturday but was fixed immediately. 
“PTK, as a state commercial company, does not deal with politics but it provides services 
to the citizens of Kosovo without distinction,” added Haxha. “In this case, we are also offering 
our services to the Serbian citizens. 
“None of the Serbian community members living in enclaves can now complain of 
having no services. All that is necessary for them to do is to help us in order for us to help them.” 
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In a statement, the TRA said: “Any deployment of telecommunication equipment without 
prior permission of the TRA will be considered unlicensed and will be treated as such.” 
Serbia, meanwhile, has vowed to do everything it can to re-activate the services of the 
Serbian-based operators. 
Speaking at a press conference on Monday, Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic said 
that the government will do "literally everything" short of using force to help the Serbs in 
Kosovo. 
"This is a very serious problem that we are facing and we will do our best to help these 
people," the prime minister said. 
Serbian President Boris Tadic has said that the country would begin an international 
effort and demand immediate action from international institutions to re-activate the services. 
Beta news agency learned from its sources in the EU that EULEX finds that the move of 
Kosovo authorities may not have been well executed, and the mission understands the 
importance of communication for the Serb population, but it also believes that some mobile 
phone transmitters were not legally there. 
EULEX spokesperson Irina Gudeljevic said that the EU rule of law mission supports any 
action of the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory Agency that is directed against, as she put 
it, unlicensed mobile phone operators. 
Gudeljevic noted previously that "Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory Agency is an 
independent body, and the EU mission is not familiar with its plans related to the north of 
Kosovo, where the signals of Serbian mobile operators are now functioning properly". 
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The state secretary at the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, Oliver Ivanovic, said that 
EULEX representatives deny involvement in the action, but the Serbian concern is that EULEX, 
as he put it, supports the move. 
In what appeared to be a retaliatory move following the action by Kosovo’s 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, three masts used by Kosovo-based mobile operators 
were blown up in the north of Kosovo over the weekend. 
 
8.2.9 Full telephone communications restored to Serb enclaves in Kosovo[49] 
12 may 2010 
 
BELGRADE, May 11 (Xinhua) -- After 19 days without a mobile telephone signal, the 
Telekom Srbija network has been restored to the 100,000 Serbs living in isolated enclaves in 
Kosovo, reported the Serbian news agency Tanjug on Tuesday. 
The mobile telephone provider has not, however, disclosed how it has managed to restore 
service to the Serbs who live south of the Ibar River; service was not disrupted in the Serb-
dominated north. 
On April 23, the Kosovo Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, claiming that 
Telekom and Telenor, the two Belgrade-based mobile service providers to Kosovo, were 
"unauthorized unlicensed, non- licensed operators," subsequently disabled or damaged over 20 
repeater and base stations on Kosovo territory. 
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Serbian officials condemned the move, saying it was part of strategy of forced 
assimilation, and that only the United Nations mission on Kosovo (UNMIK) was competent to 
regulate telecommunications according to the Security Council Resolution 1244. 
A number of retaliatory attacks on the property of Kosovo mobile phone operators 
ensued. 
On Monday, Serbian Minister for Kosovo and Metohija Goran Bogdanovic said his 
ministry and the telecommunications companies were trying to resolve the problem peacefully. 
8.2.10 Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Kosovo Cuts Cables and Removes 
Equipment Belonging to Serbian-Owned Telecom Mobile Operator[ 48] 
September 27, 2010 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Kosovo cut cables and removed equipment 
belonging to Serbian-owned Telecom mobile operator in the Serb enclaves in central and eastern 
Kosovo. The move came only a few days after Serbia and Kosovo agreed to launch as soon as 
possible a dialogue about all outstanding issues under European Union auspices.  
A Serbian Telecom official said some 80,000 out of 120,000 Serbs living in Kosovo were 
left without the signal, the Belgrade-based Beta news agency reported.Serbia's minister for 
Kosovo, Goran Bogdanovic, said It shows Pristina hasn't given up "unilateral moves and 
violence" and is creating an "atmosphere of fear" and isolating Serbs "at the moment when we 
expect negotiations on all problems, including the telecommunications one,"  
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Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 and has been 
recognized as an independent country by 70 states, including the U.S and 22 out of 27 members 
of the EU. Serbia has rejected the move and still considers Kosovo its southern province. 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Kosovo cut cables and removed equipment 
belonging to Serbian-owned Telecom mobile operator in the Serb enclaves in central and eastern 
Kosovo. The move came only a few days after Serbia and Kosovo agreed to launch as soon as 
possible a dialogue about all outstanding issues under European Union auspices.  
 
8.2.11 Kosovo-Serbia Talks: Moving Forward? “Practical problems”: what are we talking 
about? [50] 
MAR 22, 2011 
 
Of critical interest for both countries, the Kosovo-Serbia talks will aim at improving 
regional cooperation, increasing the freedom of movement, and strengthening the rule of law. 
But before tackling touchier issues, both delegations agreed to focus on easy topics and try to 
solve the nuts-and-bolts problems that have arisen since the 1999 conflict. Longstanding issues 
in the areas of documentation, transportation, commerce, and telecommunications have so far 
made everyday life in Kosovo very difficult for Albanians and Serbs alike. 
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9.0  APPENDIX B - LAW ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN KOSOVO 
9.1 LAW ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN KOSOVO- PARTICULAR 
Taking into account UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 of 25 July 1999, “On the Authority of the 
Interim Administration in Kosovo,” as amended; and UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24 of 12 
December 1999, “On the Law Applicable in Kosovo,” as amended; and 
On the basis of the authority granted by United Nations Interim Administration on Kosovo 
UNMIK Regulation No. 2001/9 of 15 May 2001, “On a Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo,” especially Sections 5.1h, 5.7, 9.1.1, 9.1.26a, 9.3.3, and 
11.2 thereof;’ 
Recognizing the need to improve the Telecommunications Sector in Kosovo by: establishing an 
independent regulatory agency responsible for licensing, regulating and supervising the 
providers of telecommunication services in Kosovo; encouraging the private sector participation 
and competition in the provision of services; setting standards for all service providers in 
Kosovo, and, establishing provisions for consumer protection: 
... 
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Section 3 
9.1.1 Authorities and Competencies 
1. The responsibilities for the implementation of telecommunications services in Kosovo shall
reside in the following entities: 
a) the Ministry shall develop policies for the sector, including the development of legislation,
and exercising all other powers transferred to it under the Constitutional Framework. 
b) the TRA, established as an independent body within the PISG by this Law, shall implement
the policies of the PISG and Ministry pursuant to this Law, and all other implementing 
legislation enacted pursuant thereto. 
c) UNMIK, through the SRSG, shall exercise those powers that are reserved to it under the
Constitutional Framework, including: 
 i           The authority to mange publicly owned telecommunications assets, including, but not 
limited to Management of essential PTK assets through the Kosovo Trust Agency KTA in 
cooperation with the PISG pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 on the Establishment of the 
Kosovo Trust Agency of 13 June 2002; 
 ii           Management of radio frequencies, carried out by the Frequency Management Office 
FMO. Some specific administrative functions will be implemented by the PISG and the 
respective independent regulatory body. And 
 iii          The regulation of the broadcast industry, which is currently executed by the Temporary 
Media Commissioner TMC.  
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2. The TRA shall coordinate all broadcasting activities with the Temporary Media Commissioner 
and with other relevant authorities in accordance with the provisions of the Broadcasting 
Regulation. 
 3. The TRA assign to service provider and users spectrum resources that are specifically 
allocated by UNMIK. 
 4. The TRA shall at its discretion, obtain from service providers and review for compliance with 
this Law, international contracts involving the provision of Telecommunications Services and 
equipment between commercial entities active in Kosovo. The TRA shall not conclude any 
agreements with states and multilateral organizations.       
 5. The Ministry shall request that the SRSG conclude on behalf of UNMIK agreements with 
states and multilateral organizations that pertain to the telecommunications sector, as well as all 
documents pertaining to the SRSG’s oversight of international agreements entered into on behalf 
of UNMIK in the telecommunications sector.  As part of the consultative process in these 
matters, the Ministry may request the right as an interested party to participate in discussions and 
negotiations conducted by the SRSG with states and multilateral organizations that are intended 
to result in the conclusion of such agreements. 
Chapter 2 
Telecommunications Regulatory Authority “TRA” 
 […] 
Section 4 
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9.1.2 Establishment of the TRA 
 
1.The Telecommunications Regulatory Authority the “TRA” is hereby established as an 
independent, non-profit body within the Ministry, and shall implement the policies of the PISG 
and the Ministry pursuant to this Law, and all other implementing legislation enacted pursuant 
thereto. 
 2. The TRA shall promote and facilitate the provision of sufficient and satisfactory domestic and 
international telecommunications services, and other services covered in the broadcasting 
regulations, provided however, that such promotion and facilitation shall not extent to free of 
charge services. 
 3. The TRA shall be governed by this Law, and shall observe the need to promote universal 
services in accordance with the principles set forth in Chapter 8 of this Law. 
 4. The TRA is authorized to issue regulations and instruction for the implementation of the 
present Law.   
… 
Chapter 12 
Radio Communications, Spectrum Resource Allocation, Numbering 
 Plan for Telecommunication Services 
Section 63 
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9.1.3 Management of the Radio Frequency Spectrum 
 
1.The radio frequency spectrum is a limited natural resource.  Frequency management is a 
reserved power by the SRSG, which has made a specific quantum or spectrum resources 
available to the PISG for re-allocation to users and service providers; all provisions pursuant to 
the allocation of spectrum resources in this Law pertain solely to those spectrum resources made 
available to the PISG.  The TRA shall reallocate to service provides only those spectrum 
resources that have been made available to it by the SRSG. 
 2.In order to protect the efficient and non-interfering use of Kosovo’s radio spectrum resources 
and the rights thereof to orbital positions the TRA shall: 
 a          establish a spectrum resource plan to allocate radio frequency bands and/or to assign 
radio frequenceis for use; 
b          allocate such radio frequency bands and/or assign radio frequencies for use; and 
c          supervise the use thereof. 
 3.The TRA’s spectrum resource plan shall become effective after SRSG review and approval in 
writing.  All allocations of spectrum resources by the TRA to service providers must be made 
available to it by the SRSG.  
 4.The TRA shall maintain all relevant information related to the allocation of spectrum 
resources, information on the assignment of radio frequencies, and other relevant information 
required to effectively manage the spectrum resources. 
 5.With the exception of that information which is related to the requirements of Kosovo security 
and/or defense, the TRA shall make the information specified in this section publicly available. 
 Section 64 
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9.1.4 Plan for Allocating Spectrum Resources 
 
1.In its plan to allocate spectrum resources and radio frequency bands, the TRA shall define the 
radio frequencies or radio frequency bands intended for allocation for individual radio 
communications and among individual groups of users and shall set out the conditions upon 
which radio frequencies may be used. 
 2.Not later than fifteen 15 days after the approval by the SRSG, the TRA in coordination and 
with the assistance of the SRSG, shall make publicly available its spectrum resource plan which 
shall conform to domestic and international laws and UNMIK Regulations binding in Kosovo.  
The plan shall take into account the requirements of Kosovo security, defense and emergencies, 
and the need to protect against natural and other disasters. 
 3.On the basis of the spectrum resource plan, the TRA shall report to the SRSG on all regional 
frequencies and the extent to which they are occupied. 
 Section 65 
Plans of Radio Frequency Use 
 1.The spectrum resource plan shall set out in detail the use of radio frequencies within the radio 
frequency bands intended for individual services by the plan for allocating radio frequencies and 
radio frequency bands, and shall set out the conditions of use therefor. 
 2.The TRA shall administer the plan described in this section. 
Section 66 
Existing Users of Radio Frequencies 
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 1. Not later than sixty 60 days after the entry into force of this Law, the TRA shall notify in 
writing all existing users of spectrum resources whose allocations fall within the spectrum 
resource plan authorized by the SRSG, of the provisions of this Chapter.  All existing holders of 
frequency spectrum allocation authorization shall retain the right of use granted by UNMIK for 
the full term, provided that they: 
 a) are legal entities properly registered as an individual or business entity in Kosovo; 
b) comply with all General Terms and Conditions applicable to the right to use spectrum; and, 
c) pay the applicable spectrum resource right to use fees.   
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10.0  APPENDIX C - RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AFTER THE 
TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM OF 1996 IN GUATEMALA125 
 
The spectrum allocation system of Guatemala changed dramatically with the “Ley 
General de Telecomunicaciones” of 1996.  Allocation of radio spectrum evolves from the bottom 
up. Private action comes first: any person or company, national or foreigner, may request any 
spectrum band not currently assigned to other users.  When conflicts arise — caused by 
interference from signals of adjacent bands and/or intermodulation distortions — private parties 
are encouraged to mediate between themselves.  If private mediation fails, specific rules are 
enforced by the telecommunication regulatory body. Additionally, the injured party may sue for 
damages in existing courts.  
From the perspective of the theory of economics of property rights, the most salient 
feature of the spectrum reform is the creation of usufruct titles in lieu of Constitutional restraint.  
In the Guatemalan Civil Code, the usufruct carries the right to use and enjoy the property of 
another tothe extent that such use and enjoyment does not destroy or diminish its essential 
substance. 
 The 1996 law specifically states that the Títulos de Usufructo de Frecuencias (TUF) may 
be leased, sold, subdivided or consolidated for a limited period (fifteen years). In fact, the TUF 
                                               
125http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/ni/spectrum/guat-rsm.pdf 
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may be evennused as equity exchanged for investment. The usufruct term can be extended for an 
additional 15 
years by a simple request at no cost to the bearer, and so on.  The electromagnetic waves 
are infinitely reusable and are not “destroyed or diminished” after being used.  Therefore, in all 
practical matters, the TUFs are the closest approximation to private property rights in radio 
spectrum that the Guatemalan law allows. Regulation is limited to interfering emissions and 
reserved bands.  
The physical TUF is a security paper certificate listing the six following basic variables 
on the  
front:  
•  frequency band;  
•  hours of operation;  
•  maximum power transmitted;  
•  maximum power emitted at the border of adjacent frequencies;  
•  geographic territory;  
•  duration of right (beginning and ending).  
The back of the TUF is for endorsements which are required whenever the instrument is 
beingnegotiated for property transfer.  The independent regulatory body established by the 1996 
law, the  Superintendencia de Telecomunicaciones  (SIT) is responsible for the TUF registry.  
This computerized database is easily accessible to the public.  Anyone may request a copy of the 
TUF inventory.  
The adjudication process contained in article 61 of the law is quite simple and has been 
implemented in practice as follows:  
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• An interested party surveys existing spectrum use in the spectrum registry of SIT.
• The party applies to SIT for the right to use a frequency band as specified in the
application form. 
• The application is evaluated by SIT which deems it accepted, incomplete, or rejected.
SIT is required, by law, to answer in 3 days or less. Grounds for rejection include technical 
interference, request of reserved or radio amateur bands.  Reserved bands are for government use 
only. 
• If the application is accepted, public notice is issued.  Parties objecting the new use file
formal complaints.  Grounds for opposition are limited to technical interference. 
• Complaints are quickly adjudicated via binding arbitration.  The adjudication process
cannot exceed 10 days. 
• Other interested parties are allowed to file competing claims to requested spectrum
rights. 
• If no competing claims are filed, then the petitioner directly receives rights without
auction gratis. 
• If competing claims filed, then SIT must schedule an auction 35 days after the end of
the opposition period. 
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